Design Horizon – An open library of emerging practices and provocations for tackling our world’s most wicked problems – Guerra (2026)

[I have to say, I’m laughing at myself. I made https://transduction.systems/ – The Necessary Tangle | A living evidence atlas of systems | cybernetics | complexity using ChatGPT (just like I made a series of ‘commissioning compasses’ at https://publicservicetransformation.org/tools/), and, just as my brother and sister-in-law chose brilliant, unique, rarely-used names for my niece and nephew, only to discover, you know, two children in the same year with the same name… they’re like Ford Cortinas… every arsheole has one! The zeitgeist and, as McLuhan would say, the media technology, has its own designs, doesn’t it? So there are now millions of compasses and living atlases, this one done by Ruth Guerra and Claude (evidently), each *somewhat* reflecting the personality of their creator and somewhat… something else.

This one is nice, conciser (36 hand-reviewed sources so far), and has some systems thinking stuff in it 🙂 ]

Design as a living compass.

Design Horizon is a free digital resource library for people creating within complexity. It was created by Ruth Guerra, a systemic designer, researcher, and founder of Phenomena Co-Design.

Explore the edges of design.

An open library of emerging practices and provocations for tackling our world’s most wicked problems.

Call for Thematic Sessions – – FedCSIS 2027

Call for Thematic Sessions — FedCSIS 2027 | Facebook

#95 Inventing Temperature, Operational Coherence, Activist Realism and Active Knowledge with Cambridge philosopher Hasok Chang

#95 Inventing Temperature, Ope… – love & philosophy – Apple Podcasts

Love & Philosophy – Andrea Hiott

love & philosophy – Podcast – Apple Podcasts

BI 247 Maxim Raginsky: A Control Theory View on Brains and AI

BI 247 Maxim Raginsky: A Control Theory View on Brains and AI | Brain Inspired

Warren McCulloch, chairman [sic] of the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, in a letter to the cybernetics group before the tenth and final conference, 1953. Discovered and shared by Sean Manion.

Updated 15 November 2026: pages 4–13 have been added from the scans shared by Sean Manion. The full set of 13 pages is now available below as a reading transcription.

Images: the complete 13-page manuscript, shared by Sean Manion. Original three-page source.

Transcription notes: Page numbering follows the manuscript. Clear handwritten and typed substitutions are incorporated; clearly struck-through wording is omitted. Large enclosing brackets and arrows are not treated as deletions or used to move passages. Obvious typing slips, spacing, punctuation, and line-break hyphenation are lightly regularised, while the author’s wording, historical terminology, and claims are retained. Square brackets mark editorial help or blanks in the manuscript. This is a reading transcription, not a diplomatic edition.

Page 1

Einstein once defined Truth as an agreement obtained by taking into account observations, their relations, and the relations of the observers. In his case the observations were the coincidences of signals at points in frames of reference; their relations were matters of space and time in those frames; his observers were reduced to what Helmholtz called a locus observandi, devoid of prejudices and imagination; and the only relations he had to consider among them were their relative positions, motions and accelerations. The Truth he had in mind is a picture of the world upon which all observers can agree, because it is expressed in a manner invariant under the transformations required to represent the relations of the observers. It is a paradigm for what ‘scientific agreement’ may mean.

Unfortunately for us our data could not be so simply defined. It has been gathered by extremely dissimilar methods, by observers biased by disparate endowment and training, and related to one another only through a babel of laboratory slangs and technical jargons. Our most notable agreement is that we have learned to know one another a bit better, and to fight fair in our shirt sleeves. That sounds Democratic, or better, Anarchistic, as you have twice reminded me. Aside from the tautologies of theory and the authority of unique access by personal observation of a fact in question, our consensus has never been unanimous. Even had it been so, I see no reason why God should have agreed with us. For we have been very ambitious in seeking those notions which pervade all purposive behavior and all understanding of our world: I mean the mechanistic basis of teleology and the flow of information through machines and men. In our own eyes we stand convicted of gross ignorance and, worse, of theoretical incompetence.

Page 2

Our meetings began chiefly because Norbert Wiener and his friends in mathematics, communication engineering and physiology had shown the applicability of the notions of inverse feedback to all problems of regulation, homeostasis and goal-directed activity, from steam-engines to human societies. Our early sessions were largely devoted to getting these notions clear in our heads, and to discovering how to employ them in our dissimilar fields. Between sessions many of us made observations and experiments inspired by them, but we generally found it difficult to collect sufficient appropriate data in the six months between meetings. At the end of the first five sessions, of which there are not, and never will be, any published transactions to humiliate us, we elected to meet but once a year, keeping our gang together as far as possible, replacing a few who were lost to us, and inviting a few speakers to help us where we needed it most.

By the time we made this change we had already discovered that what was crucial in all problems of negative feedback, in any servo system, was not the energy returned, but the information about the outcome of the action to date. Our theme shifted slowly and inevitably to a field where Norbert Wiener and his friends still were the presiding genii. It became clear that every signal had two aspects, one physical, the other mental, formal, or logical. This turned our attention to computing machinery, to the storage of information, and to probabilistic considerations including the quantity of information as negative entropy. Here belong questions of coding, of languages and their structure, of how they are learned and how they are understood, including the theme of this, our last meeting, in which we expect to range from the most formal aspects of semantics to its most contental contact with the world about us. For all our sakes I would Wiener were still with us, but I understand that he is at present happily immersed in the clear and serene domain of relativity.

Page 3

To refresh our memories and inform our guests, let me recapitulate in logical rather than chronological order, the topics we have considered, and on which I believe the majority of us have been of one mind, to the limit of our ability to understand the evidence or the theory. You may find the consensus more commonly in my statement than in our published transactions. I am compelled to watch your faces, and to guess, before I let you have the floor, whether you will speak to the point or not, and from which side of the fence. With malice aforethought I have let loose the malcontent because he had not got the point, because he disagreed, or because he doubted, however unreasonably. Before I knew you so well this happened by accident, but as time went on and we learned one another’s languages, I had learned that it was the best way to keep our wits on their toes. Our guests have been remarkably good sports, but the transcriptions of our discussions are inevitably a hash of misunderstandings and altercations instead of argument. Of those who understood and agreed the transaction reveals nary a trace.

Page 4

Feedback was defined as an alteration of input by output; gain was defined as ratio of output to input; feedback was said to be negative or inverse if the return decreased the output, say by subtracting from the input. The same term, inverse or negative feedback, was used for a similar effect, but dissimilar mechanism, wherein the return decreased the gain. The transmission of signals requires time, and gain depends on frequency; consequently circuits inverse for some frequencies may be regenerative for others. All become regenerative when gain exceeds one. Regeneration tends to extreme deviation or to schizogenic oscillation, unless gain decreases as the signal increases. Inverse feedback determines some state to be sought by the system, for it returns the system to that state by an amount which increases with the deviation from that state. Servo mechanisms are devices in which the state to be sought by the system is determined by signals sent to that system from some other source. These notions were applied to machines, including the steam engine and its governor, the steering engines of ships, to well regulated power packs, telephonic repeaters, self-tuning radios, automatic gun-pointing machinery, etc., and thereafter to living systems. Homeostasis was first considered in terms of reflexive mechanisms in which change initiated in some part of the body caused disturbances, including nervous impulses, which were reflected eventually to that part of the body where they arose, and there stopped or reversed the process that had given rise to them. Similar regulatory circuits entirely within the CNS were found to resemble the automatic volume control of commercial radios. Appetitive behavior was described as inverse feedback over a loop, part of which lay within the organism, part in the environment. When a target or a goal could be indicated in the world a description of appetitive behavior was found to be couched in the same terms as that for self-steering torpedos and self-training guns, whether these devices emitted signals reflected by their targets or merely depended upon signals emitted by the target, to readjust subsequent behavior to the outcome of previous behavior, so as to minimize its error. Wiener

Page 5

drew a most illuminating comparison between the cerebellum and the control devices of gun turrets, modern winches and cranes. The function of the cerebellum and of the controls of those machines is in each case to pre-compute the orders necessary for servo-mechanisms to bring to rest at a pre-assigned position a mass that has been put in motion which otherwise for inertial reasons would fall short of or overshoot the mark. These notions have served to guide subsequent neurophysiological research in the functional organization of the nervous system for the control of position and motion, some carried out in my laboratory in Chicago, and others by Wiener, Pitts and Rosenblueth in the Institute of Cardiology in Mexico City, as well as by our friends in other laboratories. The general organization was found to consist of multiple closed loops of control, but the circuit action was extremely non-linear, and consequently not amenable to any general simple mathematical analysis in terms of Fourier Theory. Generally multiple loops, severally stable by inverse feedback, may be unstable in conjunction, but the system can be stabilized by adding a portion of each of the returns and subtracting the sum from one or more of the servos. Such a system was found in the CNS by Sechinoff in 1865, and rediscovered by Magoun in 1946. A group of us are and shall be studying the detail of its multiple afferents and its mode of affecting all reflexive activity: we shall use destructive lesions and shall stimulate and map sources and sinks in various parts of the nervous system [using] methods presented at the last meeting. With failure of inhibitory signals or increased gain the stretch reflex becomes regenerative, producing a rise in tone and a series of contractions known as clonus. This has been elegantly analysed quantitatively by Rosenblueth, Pitts and Wiener, as described to our [number left blank]th conference. Moreover they were able to demonstrate that the pool of relays of the so-called monosynaptic arc showed two numerous groups of relays and a third less numerous, as judged by the random distribution of thresholds around three maxima. It will be years before we have fully exploited these notions.

Page 6

Closed loops within the CNS first proposed by Kubie as a substitute for undiscoverable motor activity proposed by the Behaviorists to explain thinking in terms of reflexes, and by Ranson to account for homeostatic processes within the CNS, and independently discovered and demonstrated in the case of nystagmus by Lorente de Nó, were proposed to account for transitory memories by Pitts and McCulloch, who indicated that they were logically sufficient, but physiologically improbable, as an explanation for all forms of memory. Livingston has suggested that such mechanisms might account for causalgic symptoms after blocking or removal of perverted peripheral circuits which had been rendered regenerative by some trauma which resulted in streams of impulses over small afferent neurons appreciated as burning pain. Kubie had proposed that the core of every neurosis was a reiterative process in some closed loop.

Evidence along all of these lines, with much more obtained from many varieties of intervention in causalgia, were summarized by Warren McCulloch, and presented to the Royal Society of Medicine on [date left blank]. It is clear that the notions of feedback are the appropriate ones for the understanding of the normal function and diseases of the structures in question. Since that time Dr. Galarvardin of Lyons, studying patients with auditory halucinosis, accompanied by muscular activity of mouth, tongue and larynx, has had removed, bilaterally, the post-central somaesthetic area for the face, with the consequent disappearance of the halucinosis [which] had lasted eighteen months when I last heard from him. This brings one symptom of a clearly organic psychosis into line with the findings on those obsessive compulsives who have been at least temporarily helped by frontal-leucotomy, in that the central pathways of some reverberative process within the brain have been partially interrupted.

Again in terms of these notions, we have been able to make sense of some aspects of what the psychologists have called goal-directed activity, and our attention has been duly called to the asymmetry of advance and escape, for in the former the object sought is kept near the center of the receptive field of the sense organs, and behavior duly modified to approach it, whereas, in escape, learning along these lines cannot occur, and the behavior may easily become

Page 7

stereotyped. The most complex situations we have heard discussed are the stabilities engendered by inverse feedback in social structures of isolated communities reported principally by social anthropologists. Their devices have been extremely elaborate, depending, in some cases, on many interwoven loops. They seem to have utilized elaborate forms of distinctions and rules with respect to kinship, with respect to forms of address, with respect to hazing, bullying, praise, blame, and even rituals with respect to eating. Examples from ecology and from the behavior of anthills have extended these notions of inverse feedback.

Our members interested in economics and the polling of public opinion made use of these notions to explain fluctuations of the market, the banter leading to a fight in roosters, boys, and the armament races initiating wars. In such circular systems it becomes difficult to detect the causal relations. Wiener handled this by pointing out that in those situations in which correlation was not perfect between time-series of the related component events, it was possible to detect causality in the statistical sense by auto- and inter-correlations with lag, and explain how, with such devices, optimum predictions could be obtained. He doubted the applicability of this method to social problems due to the shortness of our runs of time series of information concerning human behavior. In these terms we discussed how a fielder catches a ball and a cat a mouse.

The question of conflict between motives was then raised by the psychiatrists, who, like the psychologists, would like to have some common measure of value among human desires, comparable to what economists believe they have in the doctrine of marginal utilities and price in an open market. Kubie raised the question of the urgency of dissimilar ends, beginning with avoidance of extreme temperature, then air, thirst, eating, sleep, and finally sex, the most urgent need resulting in the simplest response, the least urgent allowing elaborate fancy play. McCulloch indicated that an organism endowed with six neurons, constituting

Page 8

three chains of inverse feedback, interrelated either by requirement of summation or inhibitory links, was sufficiently complicated to exhibit the value anomaly, and if organization were left to chance would do so half the time. That is, given A and B it would prefer A, given B and C it would prefer B, but given C and A it would prefer C. A similar question was raised concerning dominance in the peck-order (Peck-right) of chickens, but there was no adequate data as to the number of circles in coops of given numbers to settle the question. By this time we had become so weary of far flung uses of the notion of feedback, that we placed a fine of ten cents upon its use, and it was never collected. Moreover, we had all come to realize that for problems of feedback energy was the wrong thing to consider. The crucial variable was clearly information.

Two interesting digressions appeared at this point: The first on cardiac flutter as a propagated disturbance running around the periphery of an area it can not cross, and therefore can not stop itself; and fibrolation, [which] appears as a disturbance which wanders over changing paths determined from moment to moment by shifts of threshold produced by previous activities at those points. Its mathematical analysis was indicated but not presented to the group. Second, Pitts presented a theory of disturbances in random nets, such perhaps as the cerebral cortex, in which it was possible to find a value around which to perturb the activity, namely, that probability of a signal in a neuron that was equal to the probability of a signal in the neurons that are afferent to it.

Page 9

We began by considering computors as ‘analogue’ if the magnitude of some continuous variable like voltage, pressure or length was made proportional to a number entering into a computation; as ‘digital’ if they were a set of stable values (at least two) separated by regions of instability, and the number was represented by the configuration of stable states of one or more components. Analogue devices showed tendencies for errors to appear in the least significant place, but were limited by precision of manufacture, and could not be combined to secure additional places. Digital devices might show errors in any place (a limitation inherent in all positional nomenclatures), never required extreme accuracy, and could always be combined to secure another place, at the same price per place as previously. When components are relays, the digital sharpen the signal at every repetition. We considered Turing’s universal machine as a ‘model’ for brains, employing Pitts’ and McC’s calculus for activity in nervous nets. It employs the calculus of propositions of the Principia Mathematica, subscripted for the time of occurrence of an impulse of a given neuron. We demonstrated the equivalence of all general Turing machines, and how they could be designed to answer any non-paradoxical question which could be put to them in an unambiguous manner. We considered the far-flung conclusions that followed here from Goedel’s arithmetizing logic. It became clear that having ideas required circuits capable of computing invariants under the necessary groups of transformation, e.g. reverberant activity preserving the form of its afferent initiated at one time reproduces it at all times, or inverse feedback leading some figure of input by some path to a canonical one of its many legitimate presentations, e.g. centering a form in the visual field to be recognized. Gestalt notions led only to multiplications of particulars, with distortions attributed to ‘cortical fields’ in which currents are conserved, though in nature there are sources and sinks, and the areas of cortex they are said to pervade are anatomically discontinuous. The discrete action of nervous components was considered the only way in which they could normally function to handle the amount of information transmitted through them. Gross disturbances of function (epilepsy etc.) were seen to be

Page 10

accompanied by gross fluctuations affecting most of the neurons in much the same way, this producing a loss of information. Emotions were considered as expressions of some over-running of parts of the computor producing somewhat fixed responses to diffuse and variable inputs, as if, in a Turing machine the computed value of an operand ceased to affect subsequent operations. Wiener proposed by glandular means emotions might broadcast a ‘to whom it concerns’ message causing items to be locked in, or remembered. It was suggested that the best way to find out what an unknown machine did was to feed it a random input; clearly it had to be random in terms of the aspects of the input that the machine could discriminate. This was likened to the Rorschach, and its auditory equivalent, and it was noted that the gibberish produced by pre-association was apt to cause the psychiatrist to project his own difficulties on his patient.

Three kinds of storage called memory were much discussed. The first, active reverberation, c.f. accoustic tank, was recognized as responsible for nystagmus and the only storage left in presbyophrenia. Kubie’s theory of reiterative processes as the basis of neuroses, Livingston’s studies of causalgia were elaborately examined, and Galivardin’s breaking up auditory halucinosis by bilateral removal of post-central somaesthetic face areas in a patient whose mouth moved when he hallucinated was described to the group as an extension of the same mechanism to psychoses. J. Z. Young made use of the same notion to describe the residual memory after the destruction of the main memory organ of the octopus. The second type of storage has been located in no nervous system except that of the octopus where it occupies a separate structure with well defined and separate access and egress. The organ itself is composed of a host of small cells. The nature of its synapses is not yet well-known. This is the storage that has excited theoretical physicists because of the immense number of bits retained by it. Von Foerster had computed its size from access-time times access-channels against mean half-life of the trace, and Stroud from number of snap-shots one-tenth second each at say a thousand bits per frame. Figures are in rough agreement that it

Page 11

lies between ten to the thirteenth and ten to the fifteenth; instead of declining asymptotically to zero, a few percent of items are retained forever, and von Foerster has proposed mechanisms to account for this, requiring circa .02 Watts, and brain is a twenty-four Watt organ. Access to this store is probably not by simple addresses sought seriatim. Recall seems to rest on a process locating items by their contents. This was discussed by von Neumann concerning similarities, and Klüver re stimulus equivalences, but both had apparently noted retention of eidetic fragments, a topic which should be gone into much more thoroughly hereafter. Peculiarities of this kind of storage in man seem to be that the contents is a series of snapshots, each devoid of motion, that they are accessible in the order of filing, not in the reverse order, that there is a delay of the order of a minute between making of the trace and the time when it is first accessible, and finally, a snapshot too similar to the one before it may upset the process. These traces cannot be simply localized, each bit being alteration of synapses effective somewhere in a net, the alteration not confined to some one junction. The third type of storage seems to behave more like the growth with use characteristic of muscle, and shows fatigue on too frequent testing. Sherriger apparently has evidence that it can occur at a monosynaptic reflex level, and changes with use have been seen where the vagus contacts ganglionic cells in the frog’s auricle, but there is no evidence that such a change persists anywhere in the CNS, and no anatomical evidence that it even happens there. Some change of organisation with use does occur, perhaps as suggested by Ashby. The organization of the visual cortex with use is a case in point. When congenital cataracts are removed the difficulty with vision was found to be in part attributable to antithetical organization of these mechanisms by impulses from elsewhere in the CNS.

‘Traffic jams’ of brains become increasingly probable with increase in volume, for the number of long-distance connections cannot be expanded to keep pace with the number of relays to be connected, except by increasing cable-space disproportionately. It was suggested that potentiation described by Lloyd may serve to lock in lines temporarily on a basis of their previous use. This would resem-

Page 12

ble a scheme proposed in Holland for more efficient use of limited telephonic facilities. Repetitive firing of cerebro-spinal neurons leaving cell-body and dendrites largely depolarized when axones were hyper-polarized (P2 after-potential) would thus account for that component of facilitation marked by surface negativity, depth positivity, of the cerebral cortex, as a matter of lowered threshold, with increased voltage of volley delivered to cord. The same mechanism would account for the stiffening-up of the Parkinsonian.

Considerable time was spent discussing the way in which the actual flow of information determined the structures of groups, and in which command moved from moment to moment to that place in the net where most information necessary for action was concentrated. In parallel computing machines, including brains, when one part is busy or damaged another will serve for the same computation. This requires the whole machine be tended by some part of the machine which can switch the problems to them. Such a machine might give correct answers when most of it was out of commission. What appears on one side as the problem of redundancy of neurons and channels composed of them, appears on the other as the problem of securing infallible performance from fallible components. Von Neumann’s last work on this score, delivered at a conference on the West coast, is titled Toward a Probabilistic Logic.

With respect to language, as second only to vision as a source of information to brains, and all-important in human communication, not to mention psychoanalysis, it was generally admitted that one almost never said anything unless he wanted somebody to do something about it. Apart from this general hortatory aspect language contained a few signs such as ‘hum’, ‘um hum’, ‘unh unh’ and ‘huh’ that were specifically so, but otherwise contentless. The question arose whether from these appreciated by dogs and small children came the logical particle. ’Twas generally agreed, as stated by Mead, that when all definitions must be ostensive, as in learning a language where no possibility of translation exists, e.g. as a child, or as first-comer to an island of an alien tongue, it is best to learn from children because they will repeat indefinitely.

Page 13

Learning was first here defined as an alteration of transition-probabilities. Speech, broken into phonemes, distinguished according to Jacobsen by a few decisions between opposites, represented as best but poorly in morphemes, studied by Lichtliter, by chopping and distorting it to an incredible extent, retains its intelligibility when little is left beyond an indication of when pressure waves cross the axis, and even this is enormously redundant. One point, harking back to ten snapshots per second, is the peculiarity of speech to remain intelligible when each tenth second is half speech and half noise many decibels louder. Total amount of information conveyed by speech is probably not more than ten bits per second, though it takes a thousand bits per second to produce a sound indistinguishable from it. Shannon’s work on redundancy of English in reducing amount of information conveyed per symbol was studied from the position he shares with Wiener, that information is negative entropy. The recipient has a set of entities to match the signals he is intended to receive, the signal causes him to make the selection. This selective information was found to be comparable to MacKay’s logon information but not to his metron information, the point being that metron information goes up as the square of the number of metrons, rather than as the number.

We have stuck our noses into Zipf’s Law that the number of kinds of any given rarity is proportional to the square of the rarity, but I do not think we are satisfied either as to the validity of the Law, the basis of the exceptions, or the universe it presupposes. Finally, we proposed to look into the amount of information conferred upon us by our genes and to try to straighten out for ourselves those difficulties that have arisen because of confusion of the level of discourse. It’s my hope that by the time our next session is over we will place a fine of ten cents upon the use of the terms ‘quantity of information’ and ‘negentropy’.

Of the region of our disagreement I will say something when we meet.

Transcription notes

The original notes for pages 1–3 still apply: on page 3, ‘the consensus’ replaces ‘it’, and ‘trace’ replaces ‘word’. ‘Contental’ on page 2 is as typed.

Page 5: [using] supplies the missing connection in a multiply revised sentence. The conference number is blank in the scan. Page 6: the date after ‘Royal Society of Medicine on’ is blank. The crossed-out ‘which’ has been restored in square brackets to make the unfinished revision readable.

Page 8: ‘Peck-right’ is a handwritten alternative beside ‘peck-order’. The opening of the cardiac-flutter passage is incompletely revised; the typed construction is retained there. [Which] connects the adjacent revision about ‘fibrolation’, the spelling in the manuscript. The enclosing bracket and arrows are retained as an editorial issue, rather than interpreted as a definite deletion or relocation.

Page 13: the handwritten ‘his method is’ beside the passage about chopping and distorting speech does not establish an unambiguous revised sentence; the typed ‘by chopping’ construction is retained. Proper names are transcribed as they appear, including differing spellings of Galarvardin/Galivardin, and the forms Sherriger, Jacobsen, and Lichtliter.

One word is split across pages 11–12 in the manuscript: ‘resem-’ / ‘ble’.

You’re invited to: Method Showcase: Logosofia, Software for Collective Inquiry and Decision-Making

https://guild.host/events/method-showcase-logosofia-tu5ov

These Foundations of Systems Science: Key Researchers modules provide concise introductions to the work of important contributors to systems science.

Researchers – Rational-Understanding.com

ISSS – Education Resources

Education Resources

Modern supply chains must balance operational efficiency, resilience and sustainability, within increasingly complex and interconnected environments – Meriel Davies

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/merieldavies_exploring-systems-thinking-in-supply-chains-ugcPost-7508619636570238976-elI7/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAACuq-oBecVFDW6PCf3lkoG-peMeuLBeoho

“Coding Society: Programmatic Encounters Between Information Systems and Social Theory” Dr Steffen Roth

Release | Special Issue of IT&P on “Coding Society: Programmatic Encounters Between Information Systems and Social Theory” – Dr Steffen Roth

ISSS ‘foundations of systems science’ short introductory papers

have recently been developing a new series of course modules introducing the work of some of the researchers who have made important contributions to the foundations of systems science.

The first five modules cover Ludwig von Bertalanffy, W. Ross Ashby, Alexander Bogdanov, Ilya Prigogine and Roy Bhaskar. Together they introduce important ideas concerning systems and organisation, states and transformations, regulation and constraint, open systems and thermodynamics, causality, emergence and the relationship between general and more specialised systems theories.

The modules are intended both for people new to systems science and for those already familiar with the field who would like a concise way of comparing different theoretical traditions.

Each module contains a short biography and principal publications, followed by the researcher’s key definitions and propositions. An important feature is the distinction between ideas that may be applicable to General Systems Theory and those whose validity depends upon particular kinds of systems. The researcher’s original concepts are also translated into a common systems idiom, while retaining the original terminology so that similarities should not be mistaken for equivalence.

This comparative approach has another purpose. Systems science has developed through many partly separate intellectual traditions, often using different terminology for related ideas. Representing the contributions of major researchers in a consistent form makes it easier to identify genuine areas of agreement, differences that need to be understood, and questions that remain unresolved. The aim is therefore not only to study the history of systems science, but to use that history as evidence for its continuing development.

Further researcher modules will be added progressively. The course modules are open access and are available in two ways:

Open access (self-paced): https://rational-understanding.com/researchers/

Supported learning via Google Classroom through the ISSS Student SIG
Those in full-time or part-time education are especially encouraged to join the Student SIG, where they can benefit from guidance by experienced systems scientists, discussion with fellow learners, and access to a wider international community. To join go to: https://www.isss.org/home

Johan Schot: socio-technical transitions, the multi-level perspective, and Deep Transitions

Johan Schot’s work examines how the systems through which societies provide energy, food, mobility, and other necessities change over time. These are socio-technical systems: technologies, infrastructures, institutions, markets, and everyday practices develop together.

Two related approaches are worth distinguishing.

The multi-level perspective explains transitions through interactions between niches, regimes, and the wider landscape. Niches provide spaces for alternatives to develop. Regimes are the established rules and arrangements that stabilise existing systems. The landscape comprises wider developments, including cultural and economic trends, environmental pressures, and major shocks. These are analytical levels, rather than tiers of an organisation.

Developed by several researchers, including Frank Geels and Johan Schot, this perspective examines how alternatives develop, established arrangements persist or weaken, and different pathways of change become possible.

Deep Transitions, developed by Schot and Laur Kanger, extends the analysis across multiple systems and much longer periods. It asks how shared rules emerge and spread across systems, giving their development a common direction.

The framework interprets industrial modernity as a First Deep Transition, associated with fossil fuels, mechanisation, mass production, and resource-intensive consumption. A proposed Second Deep Transition would change these shared directions towards ecological sustainability and social justice. That’s a research proposition and an ambition, rather than an assured historical outcome.

Selected starting points

A Guide to Deep Transitions
A short introduction covering sustainability transitions, Deep Transitions, and their main concepts. A useful first stop, with diagrams and a glossary.

A Guide to Deep Transitions

Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways — Frank Geels and Johan Schot (2007)
Distinguishes four pathways: transformation, reconfiguration, technological substitution, and de-alignment and re-alignment. Useful for understanding why transitions don’t all follow the same sequence.

Typology of Sociotechnical Transition Pathways

Deep transitions: Emergence, acceleration, stabilization and directionality — Johan Schot and Laur Kanger (2018)
The founding framework paper. Combines the multi-level perspective with work on techno-economic paradigms to examine connected change across systems, including the role of shared ‘meta-rules’. Full paper:

Click to access Deep-Transitions_Emergence-acceleration-stabilization-and-directionality.pdf

Two current overviews (2026)
Frank Geels’ chapter on the multi-level perspective covers its foundations, developments, and current research questions:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009437318.004

Jack Davies and Johan Schot’s chapter on Deep Transitions reviews the framework, empirical research, criticisms, and further questions:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009437318.009
Both chapters are open access.

Three frames for innovation policy: R&D, systems of innovation and transformative change — Johan Schot and W. Edward Steinmueller (2018)
Connects transition research to policy. Distinguishes support for research and development, the building of innovation systems, and deliberate efforts to change socio-technical systems in response to social and environmental challenges.

Three Frames for Innovation Policy: R&D, Systems of Innovation, and Transformative Change

Previously on SysCoI

Co-evolutionary and multi-level dynamics in transitions — system innovation (Geels). Includes the aviation transition, discussion of the multi-level perspective, and a later comment linking Geels and Schot’s pathways paper:

Co-evolutionary and multi-level dynamics in transitions – system innovation (Geels)

The transition from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles — a historical application of the multi-level perspective:

The dynamics of transitions in socio-technical systems: A multi-level analysis of the transition pathway from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (1860–1930) – Geels (2006)

Leading systems change: nine strategies — Forum for the Future’s practical use of the multi-level perspective:

Leading systems change: nine strategies to transform the way the world works | Forum for the Future

Myron’s maxims: participation, power, and the work of change – Taylor (2026)

As I just said, sharing Myron’s short list of his ‘maxims’ and workshop advert (https://stream.syscoi.com/2026/10/07/myron-rogers-shares-myrons-maxims-and-offers-a-workshop/) – when I started working as a consultant in public services around 2004, these – and work by Meg Wheatley and others related – were very much in the air.

And I said that I need to engage properly, putting out my concerns/thoughts with justifications, so here we are…

Helping to create a change can be how you discover that you oppose it.

You contribute your experience. You understand the proposal better. You see consequences that weren’t apparent at the beginning. You conclude that the organisation is trying to do the wrong thing. That could be a successful participative process. It would be an awkward result for anyone using ‘people own what they help create’ as a technique for securing agreement.

This is the difficulty I have with some of Myron Rogers’s maxims. They offer useful challenges to ways of organising that exclude people, separate thinking from doing, and mistake a plan for the changes it describes. But their apparently straightforward language conceals choices about purpose, power, knowledge, and responsibility – as I said in the post above, to me, they seem contextually specific and even assumption-laden, and debatable (and perhaps the secret is to know what they are being put forward as rhetorical alternatives to. Taken as universal truths, some become misleading. It is certainly not hard – it seems to me – to offer counterexamples to them.

Myron’s own explanations contain more than the slogans. In conversation with Celine Schillinger, he admits a role for hierarchy in accountability, resources, and ethical outcomes. He describes developing people’s capability and getting clear about the issue they are addressing. His practice cannot fairly be reduced to a belief that bringing people together will make everything work – seee https://weneedsocial.com/change-in-the-workplace

Still, the sentences permeate without the practitioner and the practice, so they need to remain useful when someone invokes them in a meeting where budgets, reputations, and other people’s lives are at stake.

‘People own what they help create’

First, I agree that (in the model of the perhaps more instrumental change language), ‘those who write the plan don’t fight the plan’ – engagement in /how/ to do something can certainly align thinking on it. This is one I fundamentally agree with – though this has ethical implications!

But let me be a Miereneukker for a moment: what does ‘own’ mean? It might mean understanding something, feeling attached to it, supporting it, accepting responsibility for it, or having authority over it. Different relationships. An employee can feel responsible for a service while having little authority to alter it. A resident can help design an assessment process while objecting to the eligibility rules it administers. Someone can support a proposal they didn’t help create because they judge it worthwhile. Or plan a cuts programme they detest, to minimise damage.

Participation may develop understanding and commitment; it can’t guarantee either support or control.

There is a particular danger when the invitation to co-create concerns implementation, while the purpose, budget, and range of acceptable answers have already been settled. It’s been a lot of my work for the last 20 years! Those limits may be defensible. They should be stated. People deserve to know whether they are choosing the destination, changing the route, or suggesting improvements to the refreshments.

And participation must leave room for disagreement afterwards. ‘You helped create this’ cannot reasonably mean ‘you have surrendered your right to question it’.

Werner Ulrich’s Critical Systems Heuristics makes a further distinction: people affected by a decision are not necessarily among those involved in making it. Their absence does not make their interests disappear. Nor does agreement among those present establish that the decision is good for everyone else. https://wulrich.com/csh.html

And, of crouse, a room full of committed co-creators can produce something that works very well for them and badly for people outside the room.

I would therefore use this maxim to examine the influence people actually have. Can they change something consequential? Can they question the proposed purpose? What happens when they decline the invitation, or reach a conclusion the sponsor dislikes?

The accompanying claim, ‘You can never direct, only disturb’, needs separate treatment.
In their writing on organisational change, Margaret Wheatley and Myron Rogers argue that people interpret and recreate what they are given, rather than receiving instructions as passive components. They connect this to a living-systems account of change. https://www.margaretwheatley.com/articles/life.html (I take this to be an account of autopoiesis – referenced once – and transduction, presumably from Maturana, though he isn’t referenced. I agree with that sense of ‘disturbance’.

There is something useful here and obviosuly true; an instruction doesn’t carry its intended meaning intact into another person. People understand it through their situation, experience, relationships, and purposes. But an instruction can still direct activity. We can agree on a task, establish limits, allocate resources, and coordinate what we do. None of that requires complete control of another person.

Cybernetic regulation doesn’t require total determination of a system’s behaviour either. Ashby’s account concerns keeping selected essential variables within acceptable limits despite disturbances. It leaves a great deal unspecified. https://mail.panarchy.org/ashby/variety.1956.html

Calling an instruction a ‘disturbance’ does not remove the difference between an invitation, an agreement, and a threat. Withdrawing someone’s resources changes their possibilities whether or not they interpret the action as intended. A person may retain agency under coercion; that does not make the coercion imaginary. The practical questions concern what direction is needed, who may legitimately give it, what discretion remains, and how its consequences can be challenged. ‘Only disturb’ – an observation about autopoietic systems at the ‘zoom level’ of their information tranduction – cannot settle those questions for us.

‘Real change happens in real work’
This is a useful challenge to anyone treating a completed strategy, successful workshop, or approved programme as evidence of improvement. I wholeheartedly endorse this maxim, with only a few reservations 🙂

My working definition of work is ‘effort, to a purpose, using judgement and discretion, within boundaries, over time’. It directs attention beyond the visible activity to what people are trying to achieve, the choices available to them, and the conditions under which they act. Changing those conditions is work too.

Revising an eligibility rule can change what a service makes possible. Allocating time for learning can change whether staff can examine the effects of their decisions. Replacing an information system can remove restrictions that everyone had come to treat as inevitable. None of these activities becomes unreal because it happens away from the frontline.

Nor should ‘real work’ preserve the assumption that existing activity ought to continue. Sometimes the improvement is to stop doing something, remove the requirement for it, or help make a service unnecessary.

There is a trap here for those of us who criticise ‘workshop world’. An old note of mine says ‘no learning in the room’. That overstates the case. People can learn in a room. They can revise an understanding, form a relationship, make a commitment, or discover that they disagree. What remains unproven is how that learning will survive other contexts and what consequences it will have.

The question is what happens beyond the event, without pretending that the event is outside reality.

In public services, I use a demanding definition of an outcome: something the citizen or community would recognise as an actual benefit in their life. A better-organised service might contribute to that. It does not establish it. 2025-06-06 Outcomes are the res…

A team could become more efficient at processing referrals while residents continue to repeat their histories and assemble their own support from disconnected offers. The work has changed. We still need to ask whether the change has helped.

‘Those who do the work do the change’

Myron’s fuller explanation is about enactment. People take what they are given and make something of it. They are already participating in what the organisation becomes, whether or not a change programme formally invites them to do so. https://weneedsocial.com/change-in-the-workplace

That is more useful than the accompanying ‘those who do know how to do’. Knowing how to perform existing work is not the same as knowing how it ought to change, although in the context of operational process thinking, the version of this maxim often quoted as part of ‘lean’ – ‘the one who sweeps the floor should choose the brush’ absolutely makes a lot of sense (with some caveats).

A practitioner may understand the workarounds needed to keep a service functioning without seeing what those workarounds require of someone elsewhere. A resident may understand the service’s effects without knowing its technical dependencies. An outsider may recognise a structural difficulty that insiders have normalised, while missing local knowledge that makes an apparently obvious solution unworkable.

These are reasons to bring different forms of knowledge into relationship. They do not give any position an unrestricted claim to know. And I think that this kind of thinking /can/ lead us to focus on what enables the work from the boundary perspective at the cost of conflict with those who must put the enabling conditions in place – I would resist identifying ‘those who do the work’ exclusively with frontline staff. Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model helps keep other necessary work visible: coordination, resource allocation, checking what is actually happening, attending to future demands, and reconsidering identity and purpose. (These are functions to be performed, not an argument for five separate departments.)

Someone has to deal with conflicting demands across services. Someone has to decide what can be resourced. Someone has to notice that the present arrangement may not be viable in the future – and, indeed, sometimes to reimagine the work completely. Inviting practitioners to improve their work does not discharge these responsibilities.

Imagine asking a team to ‘own the change’ while refusing to reconsider its contradictory targets. The invitation could leave staff feeling more responsible for resolving a contradiction they have no authority to address. More often, of course, we get into radical and rebellious ideas at the boundary – sometimes a driving force for massive change – sometimes a reason for polarisation and sterile lack of change.

Certainly, those who control the conditions of work have change work to do as well. A senior manager’s contribution may be to remove a rule, resolve a conflict, defend time for learning, or make a decision they have been avoiding. Supporting participation can require quite specific uses of authority.

‘Connect the system to more of itself’

This is useful when it means restoring relationships through which people can understand and respond to consequences they have been unable to see. The gloss ‘connections create healthier systems’ makes a much less defensible claim.

More connections could mean another approval route. Another meeting. More people receiving information they can’t use. More opportunities for a dominant group to impose its categories on everyone else. Connections can enable learning and coordination. They can also propagate disruption, reinforce conformity, and consume the time needed to do anything. They can foster conspiracy, alternative competing power bases, corruption and malversation (that is a word) etc…

In the four dynamics I use, developing specialised capabilities, blending knowledge across groups, enabling individual agency, and working towards common purpose all require attention. No single direction of movement is sufficient. An organisation can suffer from fragmentation, but it can also suffer from everyone being in everyone else’s business, or from suppressing difference in pursuit of unity. The work involves judging when to differentiate and when to integrate. It does not end at a balanced midpoint where we can leave everything alone.

Ashby gives us a more precise question than ‘how connected are we?’ Regulation depends on the distinctions a regulator can make, the information its channels can carry, and the responses available to it. Adding information does not automatically add the capacity to respond. https://mail.panarchy.org/ashby/variety.1956.html

Suppose a team acquires a better view of unmet need but no additional discretion, resources, or route to influence the decisions producing it. The connection has made something visible. It may also have increased the team’s sense of helplessness. Then consider what happens to meaning as information travels. A resident describes being unable to leave the house. That account becomes a service category, then an activity count, then a green indicator in a report. Everybody may be connected. What each person can understand and do through those connections is another matter.

There is also a difficulty with ‘itself’; when I describe a system, I am making distinctions. I am deciding what belongs in the account, which relationships matter, and what purposes make the description useful. Other people may construct the situation differently. My intervention also affects what becomes visible and possible. That observer-included position is central to how I understand systems practice ‘Connect the system to itself’ can hide those decisions.

Inviting residents into a service-design meeting might help staff understand the service. It might also enlist residents in the service’s existing purposes, when those purposes are precisely what needs questioning.

A person’s life is not simply the missing part of our organisation; some boundaries should be protected: private conversations, independent judgement, spaces for dissent, and the ability to act without seeking permission from everyone else. A community should be able to organise something that does not become another component of our service model. So I want to know which relationship is missing or distorted, what the proposed connection would enable, and what it might damage. Reconnection needs a purpose that can itself be questioned.

‘Start anywhere, follow everywhere’

There is useful permission here: begin without pretending that you must first understand the whole situation. It also challenges a convenient way of avoiding responsibility. Discovering that a cause lies outside the project brief does not make the cause irrelevant. And presumably is a caution against ‘analysis paralysis’

But all starting points are not equivalent. They differ in consequence, feasibility, reversibility, and the opportunities they offer for learning. The place where we can most easily obtain permission to work may be somewhere the organisation is quite comfortable entertaining change because little consequential can change there.

‘Follow everywhere’ also needs a distinction between inquiry and intervention. We may have to investigate beyond our remit to understand a problem. That does not automatically give us authority to intervene wherever we look. Equally, lacking the authority to alter a condition does not excuse leaving it out of our account.

Imagine following repeated referral failures to a funding rule. The team cannot change that rule. It can still make the dependency explicit, show its consequences, and bring a decision to those who can act. There is no need to choose between staying obediently inside the brief and appointing ourselves to redesign the entire funding settlement.

People have finite attention and resources. Commitments need enough clarity for work to proceed: what we are addressing, what we hope to improve, what we can use, and when we will reconsider. Those boundaries should be revisable in response to what we learn. They also need to exist.

I would ideally want to start with a consequential, feasible piece of work and follow its dependencies and consequences. When those lead beyond what we can legitimately or practically do, the next task is to renegotiate the work, not quietly expand it without limit.

‘The process we use to get to the future is the future we get’

This is one of the stronger of the six for me – and also I think, the most dangerous.

Yes, a change process is already establishing relationships, expectations, habits, and distributions of authority. It is part of organisational life, not a neutral vehicle transporting us towards some future organisational life. If people are invited to challenge assumptions but discover that only certain answers are welcome, they are learning something about challenge. If a leader asks for honesty and punishes unwelcome information, the request and the response together teach people how to behave.

Alongside the announced subject of the change, people are learning what may be questioned, whose uncertainty is acceptable, and whether commitments hold when circumstances become difficult. This is why an intervention needs to examine its own effects. The way we facilitate, measure, reward, and explain what happens enters the situation we are trying to understand.

But ‘is the future we get’ sounds more deterministic than those contextual insights justify. A participative process can reach a poor decision. A carefully developed arrangement can encounter a material constraint that its designers missed. The process shapes possibilities; it does not monopolise causation.

Nor must every temporary arrangement resemble the intended continuing one. A facilitator may need to stop a powerful participant interrupting before a more equal conversation becomes possible. A temporary design group might help establish an arrangement in which that group has no continuing authority.

What needs scrutiny is the justification, the limits, and what actually follows. ‘We are centralising power temporarily so that everyone will eventually be empowered’ should face demanding questions, especially about who can end the temporary arrangement.

Participation, dignity, and fair treatment can be valuable in their own right. Their worth does not depend entirely on improving throughput. But a process we regard as ethical cannot certify its consequences as beneficial. In my own practices, I try to keep this open to correction through the experience of employees and citizens. What do they experience as a result of how we organise? Are our intentions borne out? What should make us reconsider?

But as discussed in Socialist Organiser summer camp, 1994, the argument clearly isn’t lawlike. The secretive, highly authoritarian, and militarized process of the Manhattan Project – run with strict military command and top-down government secrecy – did not result in a permanently militarized, totalitarian scientific apparatus. Instead, it birthed the modern era of civilian academic funding, international scientific exchange, and the foundational framework for peaceful nuclear energy and civilian computing infrastructure. The ARPANET, developed through Cold War military funding and top-down defense logistics controlled by the U.S. Department of Defense, the process was entirely about decentralised routing for centralised command, security, and hierarchical resilience under nuclear threat. Yet, the resulting future it created was the exact opposite: a decentralised, anarchic, open global commons of information and countercultural connection – for a while, at least! Gutenberg developed movable type through a messy, commercial, profit-driven process aimed at mass-producing traditional Catholic indulgences and Bibles to make money. The process was industrial and orthodox, but the future it actually delivered was the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, and the dismantling of religious monopoly.

There have been benevolent dictatorships, autocratic imposition of democratic constitutions. Emergency department clinicians act hierarchically, rapidly, and without participation to produce is a conscious patient who regains autonomy. Using autonomy as the process would have been impossible. Citizens’ assemblies use a non-democratic mechanism – sortition rather than voting – precisely to create a more representative deliberative body. Rigid scaffolding – a novice learning through instruction, repetition, correction, and constrained exercises – can produce an improvisational expert. A secretive, centralised, disciplined vanguard movement can overthrow an authoritarian regime and subsequently establish more plural institutions. Whether it stays plural is another matter, but the process doesn’t logically determine the destination. Anyway, you get my point – what are we even saying here?

I am sharing all this understanding I might be misunderstading something fundamental, that I might be corrected. My strong impression is that these maxims (and I appreciate a ‘maxim’ is something a little different from a ‘law of nature) are designed to provide correctives for change agents in large bureaucratic systems to break free of the instituational norms – or, perhaps, are they designed to pander to the norms and aspirations and situation of change agents in large beaurocratic systems?

As with so much ‘systems change’ and related work, I can’t help picking up this feeling of a cosy, Guardian-reading Fellow of the RSA-style bourgeois set of discursive norms being smuggled in. Just the right level of counterintuitive ‘challenge’, just enough pleasantly insightful thinking… and my concern is that I can’t help feeling that this is some learning – some very useful, valuable learning once – and perhaps it will be again – but frozen in amber, to be admired, not alive and electric and powerful now. Others’ views will differ.

The work it takes to stay the same

The maxims become more interesting when we apply them to the maintenance of an undesirable situation.

People help create familiar routines. They enact those routines in real work. They develop considerable skill in making them function. Their relationships reinforce the arrangements. The processes they use help produce similar futures. Myron explicitly recognises that people are already engaged in reproducing existing outcomes. This is not something he overlooks. The question is what follows from taking it seriously. https://weneedsocial.com/change-in-the-workplace

Imagine a referral service whose staff are invited to co-create improvements. They develop better workarounds. Reported throughput rises. Residents still repeat their histories and carry much of the burden of coordinating support, but the internal figures improve. Managers retain the targets and rules that made the workarounds necessary. Staff have participated. Practical knowledge has been used. Connections have improved. Some people may receive help sooner, which matters.

At the same time, successful coping has helped protect the conditions that require the coping. The organisation has learned to sustain an arrangement that still imposes avoidable work on residents and staff. This is a mechanism we can investigate. We can examine what the performance figures omit, what residents now have to do, which decisions staff still cannot make, and whether repeated workarounds point towards a rule that needs changing.

Calling the situation co-created must not distribute responsibility indiscriminately. A person trying to survive an arrangement they cannot change participates in it differently from someone who sets its terms. Being causally involved is not the same as consenting, endorsing, or bearing equal responsibility. There is no automatic ethical direction in participation, connection, adaptation, or learning. We still have to argue about what is worth sustaining, what should change, and whose experience ought to count.

That is where I would place these maxims: inside an ongoing practice of judgement.

They can help us notice exclusion, recover practical knowledge, and stop pretending that change can be designed elsewhere and simply installed. They also need us to examine purpose, make authority visible, protect necessary differences, and organise the means to act.

I would use them alongside clear commitments about what people can decide, what is unavoidably constrained, and how the constraints can be challenged. I would want evidence of consequences beyond the enthusiasm of the participants. And I would keep open the possibility that a useful next step is to give direction, preserve a boundary, seek outside expertise, stop an activity, or refuse the proposed change.

Consider what happens when the people we invited return and say: ‘We’ve looked at this. The problem is the rules you won’t let us change.’ Another invitation to take ownership would be a poor answer.

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