Information = Comprehension × Extension • Selection 2

Over the course of Selection 1 Peirce introduces the ideas he needs to answer stubborn questions about the validity of scientific inference.  Briefly put, the validity of scientific inference depends on the ability of symbols to express superfluous comprehension, the measure of which Peirce calls information.

Selection 2 sharpens our picture of symbols as general representations, contrasting them with two species of representation whose characters fall short of genuine symbols.

For this purpose, I must call your attention to the differences there are in the manner in which different representations stand for their objects.

In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as statues, pictures, emblems, hieroglyphics, and the like.  Such representations stand for their objects only so far as they have an actual resemblance to them — that is agree with them in some characters.  The peculiarity of such representations is that they do not determine their objects — they stand for anything more or less;  for they stand for whatever they resemble and they resemble everything more or less.

The second kind of representations are such as are set up by a convention of men or a decree of God.  Such are tallies, proper names, &c.  The peculiarity of these conventional signs is that they represent no character of their objects.

Likenesses denote nothing in particular;  conventional signs connote nothing in particular.

The third and last kind of representations are symbols or general representations.  They connote attributes and so connote them as to determine what they denote.  To this class belong all words and all conceptions.  Most combinations of words are also symbols.  A proposition, an argument, even a whole book may be, and should be, a single symbol.

(Peirce 1866, pp. 467–468)

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 7, pp. 416–432.  ArchiveOnline.

Resources

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#abduction, #c-s-peirce, #comprehension, #deduction, #extension, #hypothesis, #icon-index-symbol, #induction, #inference, #information-comprehension-x-extension, #inquiry, #intension, #logic, #peirces-categories, #pragmatic-semiotic-information, #pragmatism, #scientific-method, #semiotics, #sign-relations

Information = Comprehension × Extension • Selection 1

I am going to begin with six selections from Peirce’s Lectures of 1866 where he addresses the roles of signs informing sign relations and their relation to the rules of inference governing inquiries.

⁂ ⁂ ⁂

Our first text comes from Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1866, titled “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”.  I still remember the first time I read those words and the light that lit up the page and my mind.

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes — having two legs, being rational, &c. — which make up the comprehension of man.  Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.

Thus, let us commence with the term colour;  add to the comprehension of this term, that of redRed colour has considerably less extension than colour;  add to this the comprehension of darkdark red colour has still less [extension].  Add to this the comprehension of non‑bluenon‑blue dark red colour has the same extension as dark red colour, so that the non‑blue here performs a work of supererogation;  it tells us that no dark red colour is blue, but does none of the proper business of connotation, that of diminishing the extension at all.  Thus information measures the superfluous comprehension.  And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot make it so empty that it shall have no superfluous comprehension.

I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in this superfluous comprehension and is therefore entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of information.

(Peirce 1866, p. 467)

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 7, pp. 416–432.  ArchiveOnline.

Resources

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cc: Research GateStructural ModelingSystems ScienceSyscoi

#abduction, #c-s-peirce, #comprehension, #deduction, #extension, #hypothesis, #icon-index-symbol, #induction, #inference, #information-comprehension-x-extension, #inquiry, #intension, #logic, #peirces-categories, #pragmatic-semiotic-information, #pragmatism, #scientific-method, #semiotics, #sign-relations

Information = Comprehension × Extension • Preamble

Perhaps the best perspective from which to bring the connection between the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry into its proper focus is Peirce’s own Theory of Information, which he began setting forth in lectures at Harvard and the Lowell Institute in 1865 and 1866.  Peirce encapsulates the elements of his theory in the following formula.

Information = Comprehension × Extension

In the Resources below I link to my study of Peirce’s 1865–1866 Lectures on the Logic of Science, with selections from the lectures and my commentary on them.

Ten summers ago I hit on what struck me as a new insight into one of the most recalcitrant problems in Peirce’s semiotics and logic of science, namely, the relation between “the manner in which different representations stand for their objects” and the way in which different inferences transform states of information.  I roughed out a sketch of my epiphany in a series of blog posts then set it aside for the cool of later reflection.  Now looks to be a choice moment for taking another look.

A first pass through the variations of representation and reasoning detects the axes of iconic, indexical, and symbolic manners of representation on the one hand and the axes of abductive, inductive, and deductive modes of inference on the other.  Early and often Peirce suggests a natural correspondence between the main modes of inference and the main manners of representation but his early arguments differ from his later accounts in ways deserving close examination, partly for the extra points in his line of reasoning and partly for his explanation of indices as signs constituted by convening the variant conceptions of sundry interpreters.

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 7, pp. 416–432.  ArchiveOnline.

Resources

cc: Academia.eduCyberneticsLaws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research GateStructural ModelingSystems ScienceSyscoi

#abduction, #c-s-peirce, #comprehension, #deduction, #extension, #hypothesis, #icon-index-symbol, #induction, #inference, #information-comprehension-x-extension, #inquiry, #intension, #logic, #peirces-categories, #pragmatic-semiotic-information, #pragmatism, #scientific-method, #semiotics, #sign-relations

Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 9

This is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on a theory of information which grows out of pragmatic semiotic ideas.  All my projects are exploratory in character but this line of inquiry is more open‑ended than most.  The question is —

What is information and how does it impact the spectrum of activities answering to the name of inquiry?

Setting out on what would become his lifelong quest to explore and explain the “Logic of Science”, C.S. Peirce pierced the veil of historical confusions obscuring the issue and fixed on what he called the “laws of information” as the key to solving the puzzle.

The first hints of the Information Revolution in our understanding of scientific inquiry may be traced to Peirce’s lectures of 1865–1866 at Harvard University and the Lowell Institute.  There Peirce took up “the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference” and claimed it was “entirely removed by a consideration of the laws of information”.

Fast forward to the present and I see the Big Question as follows.  Having gone through the exercise of comparing and contrasting Peirce’s theory of information, however much it yet remains in a rough‑hewn state, with Shannon’s paradigm so pervasively informing the ongoing revolution in our understanding and use of information, I have reason to believe Peirce’s idea is root and branch more general and has the potential, with due development, to resolve many mysteries still bedeviling our grasp of inference, information, and inquiry.

Inference, Information, Inquiry

Pragmatic Semiotic Information

Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory

  • Blog Series • (1)
    • Discusssions • (1)(2)

Excursions

Blog Dialogs

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”.  Online.
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.  ArchiveJournal.  Online (doc) (pdf).

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#abduction, #c-s-peirce, #communication, #control, #cybernetics, #deduction, #determination, #discovery, #doubt, #epistemology, #fixation-of-belief, #induction, #information, #information-comprehension-x-extension, #information-theory, #inquiry, #inquiry-driven-systems, #inquiry-into-inquiry, #interpretation, #invention, #knowledge, #learning-theory, #logic, #logic-of-relatives, #logic-of-science, #mathematics, #philosophy-of-science, #pragmatic-information, #probable-reasoning, #process-thinking, #relation-theory, #scientific-inquiry, #scientific-method, #semeiosis, #semiosis, #semiotic-information, #semiotics, #sign-relational-manifolds, #sign-relations, #surveys, #triadic-relations, #uncertainty, #visualization

Survey of Definition and Determination • 4

In the early 1990s, “in the middle of life’s journey” as the saying goes, I returned to grad school in a systems engineering program with the idea of taking a more systems-theoretic approach to my development of Peircean themes, from signs and scientific inquiry to logic and information theory.

Two of the first questions calling for fresh examination were the closely related concepts of definition and determination, not only as Peirce used them in his logic and semiotics but as researchers in areas as diverse as computer science, cybernetics, physics, and systems science would find themselves forced to reconsider the concepts in later years.  That led me to collect a sample of texts where Peirce and a few other writers discuss the issues of definition and determination.  There are copies of those selections at the following sites.

What follows is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on Definition and Determination, with a focus on the part they play in Peirce’s interlinked theories of signs, information, and inquiry.  In classical logical traditions the concepts of definition and determination are closely related and their bond acquires all the more force when we view the overarching concept of constraint from an information-theoretic point of view, as Peirce did beginning in the 1860s.

Blog Dialogs

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#c-s-peirce, #comprehension, #constraint, #definition, #determination, #extension, #form, #indication, #information, #information-comprehension-x-extension, #inquiry-driven-systems, #logic, #mathematics, #scientific-method, #semiotics, #sign-relations, #structure, #systems-theory, #visualization

Survey of Cybernetics • 5

Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation (αρετης κυβερνητικης), do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow sailors?

— Plato • Alcibiades • 135 A

This is a Survey of blog posts relating to Cybernetics.  It includes the selections from Ashby’s Introduction and the comment on them I’ve posted so far, plus two series of reflections on the governance of social systems in light of cybernetic and semiotic principles.

Anthem

Ashby’s Introduction to Cybernetics

  • Chapter 11 • Requisite Variety

Blog Series

  • Theory and Therapy of Representations • (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)

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#abduction, #c-s-peirce, #communication, #control, #cybernetics, #deduction, #determination, #discovery, #doubt, #epistemology, #fixation-of-belief, #induction, #information, #information-comprehension-x-extension, #information-theory, #inquiry, #inquiry-driven-systems, #inquiry-into-inquiry, #interpretation, #invention, #knowledge, #learning-theory, #logic, #logic-of-relatives, #logic-of-science, #mathematics, #peirce, #philosophy, #philosophy-of-science, #pragmatic-information, #probable-reasoning, #process-thinking, #relation-theory, #scientific-inquiry, #scientific-method, #semeiosis, #semiosis, #semiotic-information, #semiotics, #sign-relational-manifolds, #sign-relations, #surveys, #triadic-relations, #uncertainty

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 5

This is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on three elementary forms of inference, as recognized by a logical tradition extending from Aristotle through Charles S. Peirce.  Particular attention is paid to the way the inferential rudiments combine to form the more complex patterns of analogy and inquiry.

Anthem

Blog Dialogs

Blog Series

Blog Surveys

OEIS Wiki

Ontolog Forum

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#abduction, #aristotle, #c-s-peirce, #deduction, #dewey, #discovery, #doubt, #fixation-of-belief, #functional-logic, #icon-index-symbol, #induction, #inference, #information, #inquiry, #invention, #logic, #logic-of-science, #mathematics, #morphism, #paradigmata, #paradigms, #pattern-recognition, #peirce, #philosophy, #pragmatic-maxim, #pragmatism, #scientific-inquiry, #scientific-method, #semiotics, #sign-relations, #surveys, #syllogism, #triadic-relations, #visualization