Perhaps the best perspective from which to bring the connection between the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry into its proper focus is Peirce’s own Theory of Information, which he began setting forth in lectures at Harvard and the Lowell Institute in 1865 and 1866.  Peirce encapsulates the elements of his theory in the following formula.

Information = Comprehension × Extension

In the Resources below I link to my study of Peirce’s 1865–1866 Lectures on the Logic of Science, with selections from the lectures and my commentary on them.

Ten summers ago I hit on what struck me as a new insight into one of the most recalcitrant problems in Peirce’s semiotics and logic of science, namely, the relation between “the manner in which different representations stand for their objects” and the way in which different inferences transform states of information.  I roughed out a sketch of my epiphany in a series of blog posts then set it aside for the cool of later reflection.  Now looks to be a choice moment for taking another look.

A first pass through the variations of representation and reasoning detects the axes of iconic, indexical, and symbolic manners of representation on the one hand and the axes of abductive, inductive, and deductive modes of inference on the other.  Early and often Peirce suggests a natural correspondence between the main modes of inference and the main manners of representation but his early arguments differ from his later accounts in ways deserving close examination, partly for the extra points in his line of reasoning and partly for his explanation of indices as signs constituted by convening the variant conceptions of sundry interpreters.

References

• Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
• Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 7, pp. 416–432.  Archive.  Online.

Resources

• Information = Comprehension × Extension
• Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Ma^thstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi
Perhaps the best perspective from which to bring the connection between the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry into its proper focus is Peirce’s own Theory of Information, which he began setting forth in lectures at Harvard and the Lowell Institute in 1865 and 1866.  Peirce encapsulates the elements of his theory in the following formula.

Information = Comprehension × Extension

In the Resources below I link to my study of Peirce’s 1865–1866 Lectures on the Logic of Science, with selections from the lectures and my commentary on them.

Ten summers ago I hit on what struck me as a new insight into one of the most recalcitrant problems in Peirce’s semiotics and logic of science, namely, the relation between “the manner in which different representations stand for their objects” and the way in which different inferences transform states of information.  I roughed out a sketch of my epiphany in a series of blog posts then set it aside for the cool of later reflection.  Now looks to be a choice moment for taking another look.

A first pass through the variations of representation and reasoning detects the axes of iconic, indexical, and symbolic manners of representation on the one hand and the axes of abductive, inductive, and deductive modes of inference on the other.  Early and often Peirce suggests a natural correspondence between the main modes of inference and the main manners of representation but his early arguments differ from his later accounts in ways deserving close examination, partly for the extra points in his line of reasoning and partly for his explanation of indices as signs constituted by convening the variant conceptions of sundry interpreters.

References

• Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
• Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 7, pp. 416–432.  Archive.  Online.

Resources

• Information = Comprehension × Extension
• Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Ma^thstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

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