Meta-Rationality in Cognitive Science – Stanovich (2015)

via now publishers – Meta-Rationality in Cognitive Science

Meta-Rationality in Cognitive Science

Keith E. Stanovich, University of Toronto, Canada, keith.stanovich@utoronto.ca

Suggested Citation
Keith E. Stanovich (2015), “Meta-Rationality in Cognitive Science”, Journal of Marketing Behavior: Vol. 1: No. 2, pp 147-156. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/107.00000009
Published: 21 Oct 2015
© 2015 K. E. Stanovich
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In this article:
1. Metarepresentational Issues in the Literature Under Discussion
2. Meta-Rationality and Norms
References

Abstract

The great rationality debate in cognitive science (Tetlock and Mellers 2002) has largely been conducted with a narrow view of human rationality in mind. A minority voice in the debate has been theorists who take a broader view of rationality — one that does not accept current desires and goals is given and that takes a longer view of decisions throughout a person’s life. Schwartz’s target article is clearly in the tradition of those advocating a broader view of how we conceive rationality. It has many affinities with the meta-rationality that I have previously advocated for decision science.

DOI:10.1561/107.00000009