Connecting with Source, Self, System – deep immersion

Giles Hutchins's avatarThe Nature of Business

Connecting with Source, Self, System

5th September, 2019

with Giles Hutchins and Katherine Long

Katherine Long and Giles Hutchins are hosting a unique nature-immersion retreat, an opportunity for profound reflection which will renew, re-energise and regenerate – a day that will support you to deeply re- connect with your sense of purpose, the wider systems you are a part of, and the future you seek to co-create.

Together with other change practitioners (leaders, coaches, organization design and development practitioners, activists) we will explore questions such as:

  • What shifts in ourselves, our work, and in our professional communities are needed to respond to the scale of threat this planet faces?
  • What can we learn from living-systems about resilience, adaptability, collective intelligence and change?
  • How do we support healing and wholeness in a fragmented world?
  • What can we do we resource ourselves and each other to stay aligned to ‘deep purpose’ whilst…

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Gordon Pask’s Adaptive Teaching Machines

 

Source: Gordon Pask’s Adaptive Teaching Machines

The earliest teaching machines – those built by B. F. Skinner and Sidney Pressey, for example – were not adaptive. They did promise “personalization” of sorts by allowing students to move at their own pace through the lessons, but that path was quite rigidly scripted. The machines only responded to right or wrong, allowing students to proceed to the next question if they got the previous question right. And the point, particularly of machines designed around Skinner’s theory of “operant conditioning,” was for the student to get it right, that is to maximize the positive reinforcement. As Paul Saettler writes in his 1968 book, A History of Instructional Technology, “Effective Skinnerian programming requires instructional sequences so simple that the learner hardly ever makes an error. If the learner makes too many errors – more than 5 to 10 percent – the program is considered in need of revision.” These machines could not diagnose why a student got an answer wrong or right; again, according to behaviorist theory, the machines were designed so to make sure students got it right.

Despite initial excitement of learning with a new technology like one of Skinner’s teaching machines, many students found these devices to be quite boring. “The biggest problem with programmed instruction was simply that kids hated it,” writes Bob Johnstone in Never Mind the Laptops. “In fact, it drove them nuts – especially the brighter ones. The rigidity of the seemingly endless, tiny-steps, one-word-answer format bored clever students to tears. They soon found ingenious ways of circumventing the programs and even, in some cases, of sabotaging the machines. A well-placed wad of chewing gum could throw a whole terminal out of whack.”

Adaptive Teaching Machines

Best known for Conversation Theory, the British cybernetician Gordon Pask designed a different sort of teaching machine – an adaptiveteaching machine – patenting it in 1956. This patent provides the basis for the self-adaptive keyboard instructor (SAKI), which the theorist Stafford Beer described as “possibly the first truly cybernetic device (in the full sense) to rise above the status of a ‘toy’ and reach the market as a useful machine.”

The SAKI was designed to train people to use a Hollerith key punch, a manual device used to punch holes in cards used in turn for data processing. There was at the time quite a significant demand for keypunch operators – mostly women – as this was, until the 1970s, a common method for data entry.

Image credits: Gordon Pask, “SAKI: Twenty-five years of adaptive training into the microprocessor era”

Like many teaching machines (then and now), SAKI purported to function like a human tutor. But unlike earlier teaching machines, the adaptive component of Pask’s devices offers more than just an assessment of right or wrong: they identify and measure a student’s answers – accuracy, response time – and adjust the next question accordingly. That is, the difficulty of the questions are not pre-programmed or pre-ordained.

Continues in source…

Teaching Machines: An American Story (And the Case for Gordon Pask)

 

Source: Teaching Machines: An American Story (And the Case for Gordon Pask)

6 min read

One of the criticisms I get about my work is that it is too focused on education technology in the US. I typically hear this every December, when I publish my year-end review of the field. Although I recognize that Americans are prone to self-centeredness, I don’t purposefully overlook the rest of the world’s experiences out of any sense of nationalism. Rather, I believe that education technology is imagined, developed, and implemented in a particular context. And that context is shaped by a country’s school systems, educational policies, and larger social, economic, and political forces.

(I often say: if you want to write an annual ten-part series about how your country has experienced education technology, please do.)

As I’ve written previously, many histories of education technology have been written as though this context is irrelevant. They spend little time talking about what was happening in education (as an institution, for example). As such, new technologies seem to appear out of nowhere – a creation of a genius inventor, rather than a reflection some larger cultural forces.

Teaching Machines will be limited in its scope to a particular time period in a particular country – that is, to the mid–1920s thru the late 1960s in the US. I want to be able to contextualize the work of Sidney Pressey, B. F. Skinner, Norman Crowder, and others by addressing how their machines coincided with developments in educational psychology and standardized testing; how they were responses to changes in student demographics and to the launch of Sputnik; how these machines reflected a twentieth-century fascination with gadgetry and automation; how they were part of a much larger push by businesses to sell curriculum products to schools; how they underscored that most American of values, individualism, with their proponents calling for instruction to become more “individualized.”

Education technology is not solely an American story. But the one I’m writing will be.

There is (I think) one possible exception to the American setting and American cast of characters, and that’s the British cybernetician Gordon Pask.

Continues in source…

Dancing with systems, uncertainty & positive emergence – Daniel Christian Wahl

 

Source: Dancing with systems, uncertainty & positive emergence

 

Age of Awareness
Image of a whirling Dervish (source)

Dancing with systems & designing for positive emergence

This webinar was hosted by Deeanna Burleson, Ph.D. in the ‘Topics in the field of systems science’ series intended as a contribution to the International Society for Systems Science (here is a link to the original announcement of the webinar).

The webinar (video link below) starts with a 45 minute presentation offering reflections on nearly 20 years of experience in trying to apply whole systems thinking to the field of design for sustainability and more recently regenerative development practice.

I explore the limitations of a quantity focussed science and the need for a new ‘science of qualities’. I explore how the work and thinking of Donella Meadows evolved from ‘leverage points 1.0’ to ‘leverage points 2.0’ and on to ‘Dancing with systems. Nora Bateson’s ‘warm data’ approach is mentioned as a related example of this relationships and qualities focussed work with systems from the inside. Katia Laszlo’s framing from ‘systems thinking to systems being’ is also briefly addressed.

I go on to explore some of the most common mistakes made in intervening in complex adaptive systems and highlight the need for embracing the fundamental unpredictability of such systems as we move from being detached observers to being engaged participants of such systems. In this context I also speak to the power that lies in asking the right questions and asking questions rather than offering a list of principles to follow.

To ground these theoretical considerations and paradigmatic shifts in a practical example, I offer a brief summary of my work for Gaia Education on the ‘SDG Flashcards’, the ‘SDG Project Canvas’, the ‘SDG Training of Multipliers’ and the ‘Multipliers Handbook’ as an example of ‘designing for positive emergence’ and taking Bucky Fuller’s advice that “to change the way people think, don’t tell them what to think, give them a tool the use of which will change the way they think”. The flashcards by Gaia Education and UNESCO have been used successfully on 5 continents and translated into 6 languages.

… after the presentation there is another 45 minuter conversation or Q&A session that addresses a wide range of topics related to ‘Designing Regenerative Culture’ … enjoy and share!

Productive Organisational Paradoxes – Ivo Velitchkov

You can watch the slides with animations here: http://www.strategicstructures.com/?p=1511

Short description
=============
It is often said that organisations are full of paradoxes. But this refers to contradictions and tensions. It is understood as something that needs to be taken care of. When organisations are looked at as social systems, however, it becomes clear that they are only possible because of paradoxes, and particularly paradoxes of self-reference. Understanding how these paradoxes create and maintain organisations is an important skill for practitioners trying to make sense of what’s going on and improve it. The basic generative organisational paradox is that of decisions. It brings new light not only on decision patterns and dependencies, but also on understanding the nature of objectives, power, and relations with clients.

 

 

SCIO OPEN DAY
21 JANUARY, LONDON
IVO VELITCHKOV
rganisationalOP Paradoxes
r o d u c t i v e

 

CECAN Webinar: The Human, Learning, Systems approach to managing in complexity, 1 October 2019, 13:00 BST – Dr Toby Lowe, Senior Lecturer in Public Leadership and Management, Newcastle Business School

Source: CECAN Webinar: The Human, Learning, Systems approach to managing in complexity | CECAN

CECAN Webinar: The Human, Learning, Systems approach to managing in complexity

CECAN Webinar 

CECAN Webinar: The Human, Learning, Systems approach to managing in complexity

 

Tuesday 1st October 2019, 13:00 – 14:00 BST

Presenter: Dr Toby Lowe, Senior Lecturer in Public Leadership and Management, Newcastle Business School 

 

You are warmly invited to join us for the following CECAN Webinar…

 

Webinar Overview: 

The webinar views the challenge of creating complexity-informed evaluation by seeing it as a public management challenge. How can public management adopt a more complexity-informed approach? The session will outline an emerging complexity-informed approach to public management: the Human, Learning, Systems (HLS) approach. The HLS approach involves public services responding to the variety of human need through bespoke service provision, using learning as the engine for performance improvement and stewarding the health of the systems which produce social outcomes.

 

Human

One of the three key tasks of managing work in an HLS way (including funding and commissioning of work) means creating the conditions in which people can build effective human relationships.

This means understanding human variety, using empathy to understand the lives of others, recognising people’s strengths, and trusting those who do the work. Variety, Empathy, Strengths and Trust (VEST).

 

Learning

In complex environments people are required to learn continuously in order to adapt to the dynamic, ever-changing nature of the work. In complex environments, there is no simple interventions which “works” to tackle a problem. “What works” is an on-going process of learning and adaptation.

It is the job of managers to enable staff to learn continuously as the tool for performance improvement. This means using measures to learn, not for reward/punishment. It means creating the conditions where people can be honest about their mistakes and uncertainties. It means creating reflective practice environments between and across peer groups.

This requires funders/commissioners to fund for learning and adaptation, not for “results”.

 

Systems

The outcomes we care about are not delivered by organisations. They are produced by whole systems – by hundreds of different factors working together. The final job of managers is therefore to act as Systems Stewards – to enable actors in the system to co-ordinate and collaborate effectively  – because that it was will enable positive outcomes to emerge.

 

The HLS approach has recently been outlined in this report.

 

Presenter Biography (Dr Toby Lowe, Senior Lecturer in Public Leadership and Management, Newcastle Business School):  

My purpose as an academic is to help improve the funding, commissioning and performance management of social interventions (across the public, private and voluntary sectors). My research team has used complexity theory to create a critique of New Public Management approaches, particularly highlighting the problems created by attempts to use Outcome-Based Performance Management (e.g. Payment by Results) in complex environments.

We have also developed a new complexity-informed paradigm for the funding, commissioning and performance management of social interventions, and are undertaking action research programmes with public and voluntary sector funders and delivery organisations to explore how this paradigm is implemented in practice, and to support the development of a Community of Practice around this new paradigm.

My team is also conducting working as a Learning Partner for the Lankelly Chase Foundation’s inquiry into place-based system change. In this context we are exploring how learning functions as a mechanism for system change.

I began my academic life as a political philosopher (my PhD is in the concept of community in political theory). After completing my PhD I worked in both the public and voluntary sectors for 15 years. My previous job before returning to academia was as Chief Executive of Helix Arts, a North East charity specialising in participatory arts practice with marginalised groups.

From 2015-2018 I worked at Newcastle University Business School, and Open Lab. In this context I also worked with PhD students at Open Lab exploring the role of digital technology in enabling people and organisations to reflect on their performance, and to contribute to learning in complex systems.

 

How to Join: 

This talk will take place via a Zoom Webinar – please click here to register for a place.

After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the webinar. In case you are unable to attend, a recording of the webinar will be uploaded to our website following the event.

 

CECAN 

More information:

This event is currently open to all

Contact: cecan@surrey.ac.uk

Start date
End date

Systems theory-based construct for identifying metasystem pathologies for complex system governance – Polinpapilinho F. Katina, August 2015 (PhD thesis)

Systems theory-based construct for identifying metasystem pathologies for complex system governance

PhD Thesis

August 2015

Polinpapilinho F. Katina

Source: Systems theory-based construct for identifying metasystem pathologies for complex system governance

 

pdf direct link https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Polinpapilinho_Katina/publication/323202439_Systems_theory-based_construct_for_identifying_metasystem_pathologies_for_complex_system_governance/links/5b365aa0aca2720785f69eff/Systems-theory-based-construct-for-identifying-metasystem-pathologies-for-complex-system-governance.pdf

 

Shorter article

Click to access fd7820cc84838274dd93233fbea1cd1310cd.pdf

Encyclopaedia Autopoietica: Autopoiesis & Enaction Compendium

Can’t believe I haven’t linked this before?

 

 

Source: Encyclopaedia Autopoietica: Autopoiesis & Enaction Compendium

 

 

e.g.

 

 

autopoiesis

1.
The theoretical construct definitive of the manner of operation of that class of systems that includes living systems. This term, combined from the Greek auto- (self) and poiesis(creation/production), was coined by Maturana in (approximately) 1972 (Cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xvii). Often loosely translated as ‘self-creation’ or ‘self-production’, the term connotes the process or dynamic by which an autopoietic machine / system maintains its autopoietic organization (via intrinsic processes of production of components realizing this particular organization). More specifically, autopoiesis is attributed to a machine (delineated as a a network of processes) which through that network of processes produces the components that:

“(1) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and(2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they [the components] exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.”

(Varela, 1979, p. 13)

In the primary literature, autopoiesis is not directly defined as a process. Instead it is defined indirectly, on the basis of how an ‘autopoietic machine’ operates. There are, in fact, very few instances in the primary literature where ‘autopoiesis’ is substantively treated in and of itself, and then only as a process characteristic of ‘self-production’ or ‘homeostatic organization’ — constructs themselves framed mechanicistically with respect to the subject system’s architectonics. For example, Varela (1979, pp. 24-26) comes closest to addressing ‘autopoiesis’ directly in the course of discussing productions of relations in a given system:

“What makes this system a unity with identity and individuality is that all the relations of production are coordinated in a system describable as having an invariant organization. In such a system any deformation at any place is compensated for …by keeping its organization constant as defined by the relation of the productions that constitute autopoiesis. The only thing that defines the cell as a unity (as an individual) is its autopoiesis, and thus, the only restriction put on the existence of the cell is the maintenance of autopoiesis.”(Varela, 1979, p. 26, emphasis in the original)

“…[A]utopoiesis may arise in a molecular system if the relations of production are concatenated in such a way that they produce components specifying the system as a unity that exists only while it is actively produced by such concatenation of processes. This is to say that autopoiesis arises in a molecular system only when the relation that concatenates these relations is produced and maintained constant through the production of the molecular components that constitute the system through this concatenation.”

(Varela, 1979, pp. 26-27)

NOTE: Given the above distinctions and qualifications about the nature and origin of the construct ‘autopoiesis’, the details on what makes a composite unity (system) ‘autopoietic’ are therefore to be found under the entries for autopoietic machine and autopoietic organization.

The strict, though indirect, definition of autopoiesis proposed in the early papers was intended to provide a basis for overcoming vague or problematical characterizations of living systems — particularly those which represented vitalistic explanation of biological phenomena. As Maturana (1980a, p. 45) put it, the construct of autopoiesis:

“…resulted from the direct attempt … to provide a complete characterization of the organization that makes living systems self-contained autonomous unities, and that makes explicit the relations among their components which must remain invariant under a continuous structural transformation and material turnover.”

This passage reinforces the viewpoint that it is the constitutive organization of an autopoietic system which is primary in delineating autopoiesis. This is reflected even in the less formal popular account given in The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1987, 1992):

“When we speak of living beings, we presuppose something in common between them; otherwise we wouldn’t put them in the same class we designate with the name ‘living.’ What has not been said, however, is: what is the organization that defines them as a class? Our proposition is that living beings are characterized in that, literally, they are continually self-producing. We indicate this process when we call the organization that defined them an autopoietic organization.“(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 43, emphasis added)

Having said that, Maturana and Varela proceed (as they have consistently done in the more formal literature) to delineate the autopoietic organization as the basis for ‘indicating’ the process of ‘autopoiesis.’

These last quotations illustrate a point which has proven somewhat problematical over the years. As mentioned at the outset, ‘autopoiesis’ has in fact been delineated and formally defined in terms of the constitution and operational character of an autopoietic machine or system. This definitional approach was entirely consistent with the mechanicistic perspective from which Maturana and Varela initially proceeded. To have invoked an ephemeral ‘autopoiesis’ (e.g., as a processual or qualitative referent) would have arguably entailed sliding into the sort of vitalistic explanation which they explicitly opposed and stringently avoided.

In other words, ‘autopoiesis’ is an abstract construct known solely in relation to a machine / system of a particular constitution which maintains its key constitutive character over time. Strictly speaking, autopoiesis has not been positively defined as a type of process in and of itself, even though it is clear in the context of its primary literature (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1980) that it is the dynamic or process evidenced by, and reciprocally preservative of, the autopoietic organization / autopoietic machine. Nonetheless, it became common practice (even on occasion by Maturana and Varela themselves) to allude to ‘autopoiesis’ as a rhetorical shorthand connoting (in terms of process) the constitutive and operational details of a particular system. This is most evident when addressing the dynamics of an autopoietic system — i.e., when the processes manifest in the autopoietic network comprise the referential foreground, and the mechanics of the network itself are relegated to the background.

Given the above-cited conditions, it is possibly understandable, though definitely somewhat ironic, that this indirectly- or allusively-defined shorthand term should become the de facto label for the essence of Maturana and Varela’s work, as well as a common label for that work itself (Cf. 2. below). So long as such invocations retain (or at least can be linked to) the sort of mechanicistic context in which the process ‘autopoiesis’ is definitively framed, this is not problematical. What is problematical is explanatory invocation (and reliance upon) the process or dynamic of ‘autopoiesis’ absent this context. To invoke ‘autopoiesis’ (e.g., as ‘self-production’) without concomitantly explaining the constitutive elements of the system(s) for which such invocation is made, is to deny any basis for evaluating the applicability of the construct (as it was defined originally). The most well-known example of such an invocation would be that of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who adopted ‘autopoiesis’ as a processual construct in analyzing social systems, yet never (to date) bothered to explain what in his view are the key constitutive elements (e.g., ‘organization’, ‘structure’) by which such an application might be assessed in terms of Maturana and Varela’s clear-cut definitional criteria.

The explanatory risk in invoking ‘autopoiesis’ absent attention to the machine / system manifesting it has two distinguishable (but admittedly intertwined) components. The first is that an observer may simplistically project the feature ‘autopoiesis’ onto a unity with which she has insufficient or imperfect observational engagement upon which to base its ascription. Phrased another way, stripping the processual construct away from the machine manifesting it opens the possibility of its mistaken attribution to something only partially or indirectly observed. Varela (1979) provides some illustration for this type of risk in writing of recognizing an autopoietic system (as distinct from autonomous systems in general):

“In general, the actual recognition of an autopoietic system poses a cognitive problem that has to do both with the capacity of the observer to recognize the relations that define the system as a unity, and with his capacity to distinguish the boundaries that delimit this unity in the space in which it is realized (his criteria of distinction). Since it is a defining feature of an autopoietic system that it should specify its own boundaries, a proper recognition of an autopoietic system as a unity requires that the observer perform an operation of distinction that defines the limits of the system in the same domain in which it specifies them through its autopoiesis. If this is not the case, he does not observe the autopoietic system as a unity, even though he may conceive it.”(Varela, 1979, p. 54)

The second, but related, explanatory risk has to do with ascribing autopoiesis to systems with which the observer / explainer may have ‘proper’ observational engagement, but for which the observer ignores addressing the key features of the autopoietic organization by which the process of autopoiesis is defined. Varela (1979) also addresses this issue in passing, during his discussion of ascribing autopoiesis to other (autonomous) systems (i.e., systems of similar apparent constitution or apparent mode of operation, but not ‘living systems’). Varela notes that other systems, being autonomous, entail:

“…assertion of the system’s identity through its functioning in such a way that observation proceeds through the coupling between the observer and the unit in the domain in which the unity’s operation occurs.What is unsatisfactory about autopoiesis for the characterization of other unities … is also apparent from this very description. The relations that characterize autopoiesis are relations of productions of components. … Given this notion of production of components, it follows that the cases of autopoiesis we can actually exhibit, such as living systems or model cases …, have as a criterion of distinction a topological boundary, and the processes that define them occur in a physical-like space…

Thus, the idea of autopoiesis is, by definition, restricted to relations of productions of some kind, and refers to topological boundaries. These two conditions are clearly unsatisfactory for other systems exhibiting autonomy.” […of which Varela specifically mentions animal societies and human social institutions — Ed.]

(Varela, 1979, p. 54, emphasis in the original)

The difference between autonomy and autopoiesis is that autopoietic systems must produce their own components in addition to conserving their organization . Autonomous machines need only exhibit organizational closure, and they are not required to produce their own components as part of their operation.


Cf. : allopoiesisallopoietic machineautopoietic machinemachine.


2.

A label sometimes used to denote the body of Maturana and Varela’s theoretical work.

Cf. : autopoiesis theoryautopoietic theorytheory of autopoiesis.

 


autopoiesis theory

A label for the body of Maturana and Varela’s theoretical work, occurring rarely in the writings of other authors alluding to their theories.


Cf. : autopoiesis (2.)autopoietic theorytheory of autopoiesis.

 


autopoietic closure

A term invoked by Maturana (1978) in summarily characterizing autopoietic systems. He states autopoietic closure “… is the condition for autonomy in autopoietic systems in general, and that it “… is realized through a continuous structural change under conditions of continuous material interchange with the medium.” With regard to the thermodynamic constraints relevant to the physical space, “… autopoietic closure in living systems does not imply the violation of these constraints, but constitutes a particular mode of realization of autopoiesis in a space in which thermodynamic constraints are valid.”

This term is used only within one paragraph in this paper, and as such it’s somewhat difficult to discern whether it is being used as (a) a summary term for the ‘mode of closure’ evidenced in autonomous / autopoietic systems generally, or (b) a specific analogue to more clearly delineated constructs such as operational closure or organizational closure. Because the term is invoked specifically to discuss autonomy , one might make a case that it connotes organizational closure. However, there is no evidence beyond this to suggest such a linkage between the two constructs.


Cf. : closureoperational closureorganizational closure

 


autopoietic machine (system)

machine / system which is a member of the class of autonomous systems and which meets the requirement of being organized (defined as a unity ) as a network of processes of production, transformation and destruction of components that produces the components which:

(i) through their interactions and transformations regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135, Cf. : Varela, 1979, p. 13)

Any unity meeting these specifications is an autopoietic machine / system, and any such autopoietic system realized in the physical space is a living system. The particular substantiation of a given unity — its structure — is not a sufficient factor for making the system “living”. The key feature of a living system is maintenance of its organization, i.e, preservation of the relational network which defines it as a systemic unity. Phrased another way, ‘…autopoietic systems operate as homeostatic systems that have their own organization as the critical fundamental variable that they actively maintain constant.’ (Maturana, 1975, p. 318)

Varela, Maturana & Uribe (1974) provide a concise set of criteria for autopoietic machine, arranged as a 6-point key by which one may proceed step-by-step in evaluating autopoiesis for a given unity. This key is illustrated in Table AutoKey below.


TABLE AUTOKEY:
A Six-Step Key for Determining Whether a Given Unity is Autopoietic
(Varela, Maturana & Uribe, 1974, pp. 192-193)

1. Determine if:

The unity has identifiable boundaries (via interactions)

If so:Proceed to 2.
If not:“The unity is indescribable and we can say nothing.” (p. 192)

2. Determine if:

“…there are constitutive elements of the unity, that is, components of the unity.” (p. 192)

If so:Proceed to 3.
If not:“…the unity is an unanalyzable whole and therefore not an autopoietic system.” (p. 192)

3. Determine if:

…the unity is a mechanistic system, that is, the components properties are capable of satisfying certain relations that determine in the unity the interactions and transformations of these components.” (p. 192)

If so:Proceed to 4.
If not:“…the unity is not an autopoietic system.” (p. 193)

4. Determine if:

“…the components that constitute the boundaries of the unity constitute these boundaries through preferential neighborhood relations and interactions between themselves, as determined by their properties in the space of their interactions.” (p. 193)

If so:Proceed to 5.
If not:“…you do not have an autopoietic unity because you are determining its boundaries, not the unity itself.” (p. 193)

5. Determine if:

“…the components of the boundaries of the unity are produced by the interactions of the components of the unity, either transformation of previously produced components, or by transformations and/or coupling of non-component elements that enter the unity through its boundaries.” (p. 193)

If so:Proceed to 6.
If not:“…you do not have an autopoietic unity.” (p. 193)

6. Determine if:

“…all the other components of the unity are also produced by the interactions of its components as in 5.

If so:“…you have an autopoietic unity in the space in which its components exist.” (p. 193, emphasis in the original)
If not:“…and there are components in the unity not produced by components of the unity as in 5., or if there are components of the unity which do not participate in the production of other components, you do not have an autopoietic unity.” (p. 193)

Autopoietic machines are the opposite of allopoietic machines, which are defined in terms of a purpose other than maintenance of their own organization. However, an observer can ascribe allopoietic ( allo-referred) status to an autopoietic machine within a subsuming context. Autopoietic machines may be described or manipulated as components of “…a larger system that defines the independent events which perturb them … [and] can in fact be integrated into a larger system as a component allopoietic machine, without any alteration in its autopoietic organization.” (Varela, 1979, p. 16) (See Also: higher-order, second-order, third-order) Conversely, an observer may analytically decompose an autopoietic machine, treating each of its “…partial homeostatic and regulatory mechanisms as allopoietic machines (submachines) by defining their input and output surfaces.” (Varela, 1979, p. 17) Such a decomposition does not sum up (as a collection of allopoietic submachines) to an appropriate description of autopoietic machines, because it “…does not reveal the nature of the domain of interactions that … [autopoietic machines] … define as concrete entities operating in the physical universe.” (Varela, 1979, p. 17)


Cf. : autonomy autopoiesis autonomous machine (system), machine

 


autopoietic network

A term used by Varela (1979, p. 13) to denote that “…particular network of processes (relations) of production of components …” which characterizes an autopoietic machine / system.

 


autopoietic organization

The generic term denoting the organization characterizing autopoietic machines / systems. The term “…simply means processes interlaced in the specific form of a network of productions of components which realizing the network that produced them constitute it as a unity.” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 80)


Cf. : living organizationorganization organization of the living

 


autopoietic space

“An autopoietic organization constitutes a closed domain of relations specified only with respect to the autopoietic organization that these relations constitute, and thus it defines a space in which it can be realized as a concrete system, a space whose dimensions are the relations of production of the components that realize it.”(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135)

Note that this “autopoietic space” is not isomorphic with the general physical space which is the context for realization of the composite unity . Perhaps the best interpretation is to consider an autopoietic space to be analogous to a state space (a depictive construct for a system’s attributes). Maturana and Varela (1980, pp. 90 ff.) ascribe three dimensions to the autopoietic space, corresponding to the three classes of relations of production.


Cf. : domainrelations of productionspace

 

 

Some Streams of Systemic Thought – Schwarz, extended Durant, IIGSS, Hadorn

 

Source: Some Streams of Systemic Thought

(alt links:

 

and

Click to access MapOfSystemsAnnotated.pdf

Some Streams of Systemic Thought

THURSDAY, 28 JULY 2016 06:48 WRITTEN BY

Some Streams of Systemic Thought

In terms of systems thinking, an extensive map of related work and their influences is presented by the International Institute for General Systems Studies (IIGSS, 2001). This map was originated by E. Schwarz in 1996. It includes the influences of researchers in the domains of mathematics, physics, computer science, engineering, cybernetics, systemics, biology, ecology, sociology and philosophy fromancient times to the present.

With the permission of Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest (director of IIGSS), we update the map and add recent work in the field of cybernetics, systemics and coordination. Because the latest source files of that map are missing, we completely redraw it. We choose graphml, an open source format for graph design.

Legend of Map

The map encompasses different nodes and edges. The nodes denote topics, such as scientific work or research areas. Major influences between the topics are illustrated by directed edges. The map uses a color-code to show the major scientific realm of nodes and edges:

  • white: general system
  • red: cybernetics
  • black: physical sciences
  • blue: mathematics
  • dark red: computers & informatics
  • green: biology & medicine
  • yellow: symbolic systems
  • orange: social systems
  • light green: ecology
  • gray: philosophy
  • cyan: systems analysis
  • purple: engineering

History

Following list illustrates the origin and updates from the map.

  • Originated in 1996 by Dr. Eric Schwarz, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
  • Extended in 1998, including items from the “The Story of Philosophy” by Will Durant (1933).
  • Elaborated in 2000-2001 from many sources for the International Institute for General Systems Studies.
  • Extended in 2016 by Benjamin Hadorn, Fribourg, Switzerland.

Your contribution: Feel free to extend and correct the graph. Please send an updated version to us in order to keep a current version online.
Thanks.

visualcomplexity.com | A visual exploration on mapping complex networks

 

Source: visualcomplexity.com | A visual exploration on mapping complex networks

 

 

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A simple contagion process describes spreading of traffic jams in urban networks

cxdig's avatarComplexity Digest

The spread of traffic jams in urban networks has long been viewed as a complex spatio-temporal phenomenon that often requires computationally intensive microscopic models for analysis purposes. In this study, we present a framework to describe the dynamics of congestion propagation and dissipation of traffic in cities using a simple contagion process, inspired by those used to model infectious disease spread in a population. We introduce two novel macroscopic characteristics of network traffic, namely congestion propagation rate b{eta} and congestion dissipation rate {mu}. We describe the dynamics of congestion propagation and dissipation using these new parameters, b{eta}, and {mu}, embedded within a system of ordinary differential equations, analogous to the well-known Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. The proposed contagion-based dynamics are verified through an empirical multi-city analysis, and can be used to monitor, predict and control the fraction of congested links in the network over time.

 

A simple contagion process describes…

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Homeostasis, Bernard (1865), Cannon (1926), Barcroft (1932)

The concept of the regulation of the internal environment was described by French physiologist Claude Bernard in 1865, and the word homeostasis was coined by Walter Bradford Cannon in 1926.[5][6] In 1932, Joseph Barcroft a British physiologist, was the first to say that higher brain function required the most stable internal environment. Thus, to Barcroft homeostasis was not only organized by the brain—homeostasis served the brain.[7] Homeostasis is an almost exclusively biological term, referring to the concepts described by Bernard and Cannon, concerning the constancy of the internal environment in which the cells of the body live and survive.[5][6][8] The term cybernetics is applied to technological control systems such as thermostats, which function as homeostatic mechanisms, but is often defined much more broadly than the biological term of homeostasis.[4][9][10][11]

 

Source: Homeostasis – Wikipedia

Cannon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Bradford_Cannon

Bernard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_Bernard

Barcroft https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Barcroft

(Extracts from) self-regulation of the body (Cannon, 1939) http://www.cybsoc.org/cannon.pdf

Walter Cannon and Self-Regulation in Animals (Hagen) http://shipseducation.net/db/cannon.pdf

 

Good core references: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/homeostasis

https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Human_Physiology/Homeostasis

 

Some alternative points:

Claude Bernard, The “Milieu Intérieur”, and Regulatory Physiology

Frederic L. Holmes
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Vol. 8, No. 1 (1986), pp. 3-25

Abstract

Claude Bernard’s idea of the ‘milieu intérieur’ has been incorporated into modern physiology as a fundamental unifying concept. Bernard developed his conception, however, with a framework of nineteenth century concerns that differ in important ways from those of the present. This article summarizes the origins of Bernard’s idea, the contemporary issues in physiology to which it was a response, and the gradual evolution of the idea in his thought up until the end of his career. Only in the late stages of development did Bernard make regulatory mechanisms central to the idea of the internal environment, even though he had himself much earlier made important discoveries concerning specific physiological regulatory systems. The paper discusses Bernard’s views on physiological regulation, comparing them to the views of other pioneers in this field particularly those of Carl Bergmann.

 

 

Research review
From Claude Bernard to Walter Cannon. Emergence of the concept of homeostasis
Steven J. Cooper

Roots of current conceptions of the regulation of states of the body through negative feedback mechanisms are traced back to Bernard’s ideas on active stabilisation of bodily states against disturbances from the outside, revived by Henderson and Haldane, and crystallised in Cannon’s concept of homeostasis.
2008

Click to access cooper2008.pdf

 

A. Querido and J. van Gijn
‘The Wisdom of the Body’: the Usefulness of Systems Thinking for Medicine

Abstract
An attempt is made to evaluate the application of system thinking to medical
problems. Two examples clarify the difference between the atomistic
approach and considering the organism as a whoIe. After elucidation of the
roots of system thinking – especially in connection with natural systems –
some consequences of the integrative approach for both the theory and the
practice of medicine are discussed, as weIl as its significance for medical
education.

Click to access PU00011604.pdf

 

Reference in cybernetics: a new management tool (Clemson, 1984)

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VqQpICD5IXgC&pg=PA215&lpg=PA215&dq=Canon:+%27A+system+survives+only+so+long+as+all+essential+variables+are+maintained+within+their+physiological+limits.

 

Adaptive Homeostasis

Homeostasis is a central pillar of modern Physiology. The term homeostasis was invented by Walter Bradford Cannon in an attempt to extend and codify the principle of ‘milieu intérieur,’ or a constant interior bodily environment, that had previously been postulated by Claude Bernard. Clearly, ‘milieu intérieur’ and homeostasis have served us well for over a century. Nevertheless, research on signal transduction systems that regulate gene expression, or that cause biochemical alterations to existing enzymes, in response to external and internal stimuli makes it clear that biological systems are continuously making short-term adaptations both to set-points, and to the range of ‘normal’ capacity. These transient adaptations typically occur in response to relatively mild changes in conditions, to programs of exercise training, or to sub-toxic, non-damaging levels of chemical agents; thus the terms hormesis, heterostasis, and allostasis are not accurate descriptors. Therefore, an operational adjustment to our understanding of homeostasis suggests that the modified term, Adaptive Homeostasis may be useful especially in studies of stress, toxicology, disease, and aging. Adaptive Homeostasis may be defined as follows: ‘The transient expansion or contraction of the homeostatic range in response to exposure to sub-toxic, non-damaging, signaling molecules or events, or the removal or cessation of such molecules or events.”

Keywords: Homeostasis, Adaptation, Stress, Hormesis, Nrf2, Aging

 

 

 

. 2015 Dec; 39(4): 259–266.
PMCID: PMC4669363
PMID: 26628646

A physiologist’s view of homeostasis

Abstract

Homeostasis is a core concept necessary for understanding the many regulatory mechanisms in physiology. Claude Bernard originally proposed the concept of the constancy of the “milieu interieur,” but his discussion was rather abstract. Walter Cannon introduced the term “homeostasis” and expanded Bernard’s notion of “constancy” of the internal environment in an explicit and concrete way. In the 1960s, homeostatic regulatory mechanisms in physiology began to be described as discrete processes following the application of engineering control system analysis to physiological systems. Unfortunately, many undergraduate texts continue to highlight abstract aspects of the concept rather than emphasizing a general model that can be specifically and comprehensively applied to all homeostatic mechanisms. As a result, students and instructors alike often fail to develop a clear, concise model with which to think about such systems. In this article, we present a standard model for homeostatic mechanisms to be used at the undergraduate level. We discuss common sources of confusion (“sticky points”) that arise from inconsistencies in vocabulary and illustrations found in popular undergraduate texts. Finally, we propose a simplified model and vocabulary set for helping undergraduate students build effective mental models of homeostatic regulation in physiological systems.

Keywords: homeostasis, negative feedback, regulation, core concepts

in 2007, a group of 21 biologists from a wide range of disciplines agreed that “homeostasis” was one of eight core concepts in biology (). Two years later, the American Association of Medical Colleges and Howard Hughes Medical Institute in its report () on the scientific foundations for future physicians similarly identified the ability to apply knowledge about “homeostasis” as one of the core competencies (competency M1).

From our perspective as physiologists, it is clear that homeostasis is a core concept of our discipline. When we asked physiology instructors from a broad range of educational institutions what they thought the “big ideas” (concepts) of physiology were, we found that they too identified “homeostasis” and “cell membranes” as the two most important big ideas in physiology (). In a subsequent survey (), physiology instructors ranked homeostasis as one of the core concepts critical to understanding physiology.

If, as these surveys indicate, the concept of homeostasis is central to understanding physiological mechanisms, one would expect that instructors and textbooks would present a consistent model of the concept. However, an examination of 11 commonly used undergraduate physiology and biology textbooks revealed that this is not necessarily the case ().

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4669363/

 

 

A first lesson in meta-rationality | Meaningness

Always worth sharing this classic – can’t believe it wasn’t on here – must have been on model.report 🙂

A first lesson in meta-rationality, or stage 5 cognition, using Bongard problems as a laboratory.

Source: A first lesson in meta-rationality | Meaningness

My comment and David’s response:

Read as philosophy, this is mind blowing stuff – thank you

Thanks for curating and presenting this. I have been exploring, as a practitioner with a slight romantic yen for academia, ‘systems thinking’ for some time. In that universe, like Terry Pritchett tree frog, the moment you think you have got it sussed, you see a new ring of leaf-edges on the horizon. This has now opened up huge horizons for me, and as a meta model for meta cognition, explaining for example why consultants shouldn’t codify method (and, perhaps, why method /can’t/ be codified). As a teaching tool I think it could be one of the best.

It was fun and slightly punctured my bubble to read some of the comments, with the technical discussions over the rule base for the game and the possibilities of human-created non-human ‘intelligence’. I think, though worthy and meaningful, they miss the point. The point, for me, is that the rules are contestable. This post is like the inflection point between the early Wittgenstein (‘the world is everything that is the case’ and the bit about the ladder we climb and pull up after ourselves, and ‘whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must pass over in silence – the logical absolutist sucked into dualism by the mystical) and latter Wittgenstein – word games and language acts (basically a meaningful reassertion of ‘it’s tortoises all the way down). Cool.

Philosophy & management consulting

Thank you, glad you liked it! I expect to write much more about meta-systematic cognition in coming months. If you haven’t already seen it, this post is an abstract overview, and most of the other recent posts in the metablog are also relevant.

I didn’t mention in this post that I am drawing heavily on Robert Kegan’s adult developmental theory, which makes meta-systematicity “stage 5” of cognitive development.

Kegan was an academic experimental psychologist at Harvard, but for the past 20 years seems to have put most of his energy into management consulting for executive development. I know little about that work (although I intend to learn more soon). You might want to look into it.

why consultants shouldn’t codify method (and, perhaps, why method /can’t/ be codified)

Right. This is a key to “stage 5” in Kegan’s scheme. Everything in reality is both nebulous (vague, ambiguous, constantly-changing) and patterned. Systems and methods rely on patterns, and tend to break down in the face of nebulosity. Skill in working with nebulosity is meta-systematic “fluidity.”

the inflection point between the early and later Wittgenstein

Right, exactly. Wittgenstein was one of the first people to begin to understand these issues (in Philosophical Investigations). Heidegger did so also, a bit earlier, and perhaps in greater depth, although considerably less clearly.

 

 

Snakes all the Way Down: Varela’s Calculus for Self-Reference and the Praxis of Paradise – André Reichel (2011)

 

Click to access REI_2011_Snakes.pdf

(pdf)

 

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/sres.1105

Research Paper

Snakes all the Way Down: Varela’s Calculus for Self-Reference and the
Praxis of Paradise

 

André Reichel*
European Center for Sustainability Research, Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany

This contribution seeks to commemorate Francisco Varela’s formal conceptions of self-reference, providing an overview of his writings while shedding some light in the praxis of self-reference, from where a future research agenda can be derived. The architecture of Varela’s thinking, determined by the interrelated notions of autopoiesis, autonomy, closure and self-reference, was examined. The emphasis was on the development and expansions of his calculus for self-reference from George Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form. After dealing with some of the criticism launched at both works, an appraisal of the praxis of self-reference of Varela’s thinking in action was given. The outlook rounds up this contribution, shedding some light on a possible future research agenda for the formalization of theory and praxis of self-reference.

 

Keywords Francisco Varela; self-reference; Laws of Form; closure; autonomy

 

“If everybody would agree that their current
reality is a reality, and that what we essentially
share is our capacity for constructing a reality,
then perhaps we could agree on a metaagreement for computing a reality that would
mean survival and dignity for everybody on
the planet, rather than each group being sold
on a particular way of doing things. Thus,
self-reference is, for me, the nerve of this logic
of paradise . . .”

(Varela, 1976: 31)

 

Human information processing in complex networks

cxdig's avatarComplexity Digest

Humans communicate using systems of interconnected stimuli or concepts — from language and music to literature and science — yet it remains unclear how, if at all, the structure of these networks supports the communication of information. Although information theory provides tools to quantify the information produced by a system, traditional metrics do not account for the inefficient and biased ways that humans process this information. Here we develop an analytical framework to study the information generated by a system as perceived by a human observer. We demonstrate experimentally that this perceived information depends critically on a system’s network topology. Applying our framework to several real networks, we find that they communicate a large amount of information (having high entropy) and do so efficiently (maintaining low divergence from human expectations). Moreover, we show that such efficient communication arises in networks that are simultaneously heterogeneous, with high-degree hubs, and clustered, with…

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