Soon after I made my third foray into grad school, this time in Systems Engineering, I was trying to explain sign relations to my advisor and he, being the very model of a modern systems engineer, asked me to give a concrete example of a sign relation, as simple as possible without being trivial.  After much cudgeling of the grey matter I came up with a pair of examples which had the added benefit of bearing instructive relationships to each other.  Despite their simplicity, the examples to follow have subtleties of their own and their careful treatment serves to illustrate important issues in the general theory of signs.

Imagine a discussion between two people, Ann and Bob, and attend only to the aspects of their interpretive practice involving the use of the following nouns and pronouns.

• The object domain of their discussion is the set of two people

• The sign domain of their discussion is the set of four signs

Ann and Bob are not only the passive objects of linguistic references but also the active interpreters of the language they use.  The system of interpretation associated with each language user can be represented in the form of an individual three‑place relation known as the sign relation of that interpreter.

In terms of its set‑theoretic extension, a sign relation is a subset of a cartesian product   The three sets are known as the object domain, the sign domain, and the interpretant domain, respectively, of the sign relation

Broadly speaking, the three domains of a sign relation may be any sets at all but the types of sign relations contemplated in formal settings are usually constrained to having   In those cases it becomes convenient to lump signs and interpretants together in a single class called a sign system or syntactic domain.  In the forthcoming examples and are identical as sets, so the same elements manifest themselves in two different roles of the sign relations in question.

When it becomes necessary to refer to the whole set of objects and signs in the union of the domains for a given sign relation we will call this set the World of and write

To facilitate an interest in the formal structures of sign relations and to keep notations as simple as possible as the examples become more complicated, it serves to introduce the following general notations.

Introducing a few abbreviations for use in the Example, we have the following data.

In the present example,

Tables 1a and 1b show the sign relations associated with the interpreters and respectively.  In this arrangement the rows of each Table list the ordered triples of the form belonging to the corresponding sign relations,

The Tables codify a rudimentary level of interpretive practice for the agents and and provide a basis for formalizing the initial semantics appropriate to their common syntactic domain.  Each row of a Table lists an object and two co‑referent signs, together forming an ordered triple called an elementary sign relation, in other words, one element of the relation’s set‑theoretic extension.

Already in this elementary context, there are several meanings which might attach to the project of a formal semiotics, or a formal theory of meaning for signs.  In the process of discussing the alternatives, it is useful to introduce a few terms occasionally used in the philosophy of language to point out the needed distinctions.  That is the task we’ll turn to next.

Resources

• Sign Relation • OEIS • MyWikiBiz • Wikiversity
• Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

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There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry.  In fact, the correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels it is often best to treat them as integral parts of one and the same subject.  In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come to be established and continue to evolve.  In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting the various ways in which things acquire significance” (Dewey, 38).

Tracing the passage of inquiry through the medium of signs calls for an active, intricate form of cooperation between the converging modes of investigation.  Its proper character is best understood by realizing the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of sign relations, a subject the theory of signs is specialized to treat from comparative and structural points of view.

References

• Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA.  Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.  Online.
• Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  Archive.  Journal.  Online (doc) (pdf).

Resources

• Sign Relation • OEIS • MyWikiBiz • Wikiversity
• Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
• Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems

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One of Peirce’s clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question arises whether signhood is an absolute, essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role a thing may be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

Peirce’s definition of a sign defines it in relation to its objects and its interpretant signs, and thus defines signhood in relative terms, by means of a predicate with three places.  In that definition, signhood is a role in a triadic relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a determinate context of relationships — it is not an absolute or non‑relative property of a thing‑in‑itself, one it possesses independently of all relationships to other things.

Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

• Correspondence.  From the way Peirce uses the term throughout his work, it is clear he means what he elsewhere calls a “triple correspondence”, and thus this is just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself.  In particular, his use of the term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, like the kinds of “mirror image” correspondence between realities and representations bandied about in contemporary controversies about “correspondence theories of truth”.

• Determination.  Peirce’s concept of determination is broader in several directions than the sense of the word referring to strictly deterministic causal‑temporal processes.  First, and especially in this context, he is invoking a more general concept of determination, what is called a formal or informational determination, as in saying “two points determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal and temporal determinisms.  Second, he characteristically allows for what is called determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism admitting a full spectrum of more and less determined relationships.

• Non‑psychological.  Peirce’s “non‑psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of anti‑psychologism.  He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them.  But logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they have occasion to view the same data, as logic is a normative science where psychology is a descriptive science, and so they have very different aims, methods, and rationales.

Reference

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

Resources

• Sign Relation • OEIS • MyWikiBiz • Wikiversity
• Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

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cc: Cybernetics • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

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In his picturesque illustration of a sign relation, along with his tracing of a corresponding sign process, or semiosis, Peirce uses the technical term representamen for his concept of a sign, but the shorter word is precise enough, so long as one recognizes its meaning in a particular theory of signs is given by a specific definition of what it means to be a sign.

Resources

• Sign Relation • OEIS • MyWikiBiz • Wikiversity
• Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

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cc: Cybernetics • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

#c-s-peirce, #connotation, #denotation, #inquiry, #logic, #logic-of-relatives, #mathematics, #relation-theory, #semiosis, #semiotic-equivalence-relations, #semiotics, #sign-relations, #triadic-relations